Pretnja (kako jedna recenica utice globalno na svet)

Pretnja (kako jedna recenica utice globalno na svet)

  • Pridružio: 22 Jul 2006
  • Poruke: 944
  • Gde živiš: SekiLand

The Threat

“The end of the Cold War has made such a strategy [MAD] largely irrelevant. Barely plausible when there was only one strategic opponent, the theory makes no sense in a multipolar world of proliferating nuclear powers. Mutual destruction is not likely to work against religious fanatics; desperate leaders may blackmail with nuclear weapons; blackmail or accidents could run out of control. And when these dangers materialize, the refusal to have made timely provisions will shake confidence in all institutions of government. At a minimum, the rudiments of a defense system capable of rapid expansion should be put into place.”

- Henry Kissinger, March 9, 1995.

Potencijalni protivnici

North Korea

The Threat from China

From a strategic point of view, China is different from Russia.

* Whereas the Russians have given up many of the holdings of the former Soviet Union (with some exceptions), China by contrast lays claim to the Republic of China on Taiwan, as well as to other island possessions claimed by Japan and the Philippines.
* The Communist Chinese harbor ill feelings over past Japanese imperialism on the mainland.
* As the Russians engage in arms-control diplomacy, the Chinese engage in a military buildup.
* The People’s Liberation Army is aggressively building a modern nuclear force capable of causing mass destruction.
* The Central Intelligence Agency confirmed in 1998 that in addition having over 600 nuclear weapons, China has at least 13 nuclear-armed ICBMs aimed at the United States. Each one is capable of destroying major U.S. cities.
* The Dong Feng 31 missile, with a range of 4,960 miles, gives China major strike capability against targets in Hawaii and along the entire west coast of the United States. China’s next generation of ICBMs, the DF 41 and the DF 5A, will soon be capable of delivering large nuclear payloads anywhere in the U.S.

Chinese Missile Warfare

The earliest Chinese missiles were copies of Soviet intermediate range missiles. These had only enough range to hit Japan or Taiwan. The Chinese copies of the US Titan long range missile had only the capacity to hit the United States with a handful of inaccurate warheads, if any. They were not enough to deter the US from anything it might have wanted to do vis a vis China. Nor could China have used its early missiles to assure the conquest of Taiwan, because these missiles could not have destroyed enough of Taiwan´s military to make up for the incapacity of China´s own military to mount an invasion. Had Chinese missiles struck Japan they would have raised that country’s ire without denting its capacity to do whatever it wanted to China. However, because China´s early missiles were able to strike Soviet cities in substantial number, they served to deter the 53 divisions that the Soviet Union had placed on the Chinese border during the 1970s and 1980s.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, a wealthier China built a more technically sophisticated missile force with three purposes: short range missiles to help conquer Taiwan, medium range missiles to gain supremacy in East Asia by eclipsing the status of Japan, and long range missiles to deter the United States from interfering in the first two.

The short range (300 mile) of M9 missiles, some 600 of which are located along the coast facing Taiwan, are numerous and accurate enough to strike Taiwanese military targets in support of an invasion. Nevertheless, it is far from clear whether, armed with conventional weapons, they could do sufficient damage to well fortified Taiwanese forces to hamper resistance to an invasion. Chinese missiles could devastate Taiwanese forces if they struck with nuclear weapons. But a nuclear attack on Taiwan would be politically problematic. Chinese short range missiles however can help China conquer Taiwan by endangering shipping around the island, striking its ports, and thus cutting Taiwan off from the world.

China´s medium range missiles can also attack other ports on the Pacific rim, thus isolating the countries of vast region from Thailand to Japan from any help they might need to resist whatever military pressure China might choose to exert.

By striking the ports of Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, Chinese missiles not only can destroy large portions of these countries, navies — including any US ships that might be based there or be visiting there in a crisis. More important, destruction of the ports would make it well nigh impossible for the United States to land enough troops and materiel to interfere with whatever plans China might have. The Pacific rim would be off limits to US influence so long as the ports remained under missile threat.

China´s medium range missiles would be targeted principally against Russian cities, to deter Russian interference in whatever China might want to do in the Pacific rim. These missiles could also strike Russian forces during the vulnerable trans Siberian journey they would have to make to interfere with China in East Asia.

Deterrence of US interference with Chinese plans in East Asia is the only purpose of the new class of Chinese long range missiles. China will not build, and does not need, the hundreds of long range missiles that would be required to dent US military forces — never mind military capabilities. But the capacity surely to deliver tens of warheads on undefended American cities will be enough to keep America out of a region that its other missiles will already have made into a Chinese bastion.

China’s larger arsenal primarily consists, however of short and intermediate range ballistic missiles. Many of these missiles have been moved to the coast near Taiwan. According to a 2003 report by the Department of Defense, some 450 such shorter range missiles are currently within striking range of Taiwan, and are now being increased at a rate of 75 per year.
Chinese SRBMs and IRBMs

The first operational Chinese ballistic missile, the liquid-fuelled CSS-1, was reverse-engineered from two Russian R-2 (SS-3) IRBMs delivered in 1958. First flight tested in 1965, the CSS-1/DF-2 was a single stage system carrying a conventional high explosive warhead over a distance of some 1,200 km. The CSS-1 has since been largely superseded by the CSS-2, which can deliver a 3 mt nuclear warhead over a distance of some 2,800 km. Some 36 CSS-2s with conventional warheads were purchased by Saudi Arabia in 1988, where they are maintained and operated by Chinese personnel. The CSS-2 gives Saudi Arabia the longest-range TBM capability in the Gulf region, and enables them to target cities as far apart as Moscow, Algiers and Rome. According to a classified assessment by the U.S. National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) obtained in July 1997 by the Washington Times, China currently deploys 40 CSS-2s at six field garrisons and launch complexes. The report noted that this force is being reduced and will be replaced by solid-fueled CSS-5 MRBMs. The entire CSS-2 force could be phased out by 2002, according to the NAIC report. At the Tonghua Launch Complex in northeastern China near North Korea, China maintains 24 launchers, eight for CSS-2 class missiles and the rest for the CSS-5. An additional four CSS-2 launchers are located at nearby Dengshahe Field Garrison, but training activity at this site has been low in the 1990s. Another 16 CSS-2 launch garrisons are in place at the Lianxiwang Launch Complex within striking distance of Taiwan. NAIC estimates that the CSS-2 force at this site will decline to eight launchers until “the system is retired” in the next decade. Two other launch sites were identified by NAIC: the Jianshui Launch Complex opposite Vietnam, which contains eight CSS-2 and eight CSS-5 launchers and allows target coverage of Southeast Asia and as far as India, and the Datong Field Garrison in central China, which contains CSS-2 and is apparently being modernized to accommodate the CSS-5. China’s CSS-5 / DF-21 (Dong Feng or East Wind) MRBM and the CSS-3 / DF-4 IRBM are normally deployed with nuclear warheads. However recent reports suggest that China is reconfiguring some of its DF-21 missiles with conventional high explosive warheads following the Chinese military’s analysis of the 1991 Gulf War. China is also reported to have started work on another IRBM, the DF-25, that can deliver conventional warheads up to a range of some 1,700 km. However reports during 1996 indicated that the DF-25 programme may now have been terminated. Chinese defence planners have apparently recognised that conventional, high-explosive missile warheads add an important deterrent and warfighting dimension, especially in regional conflict scenarios, permitting stand-off targeting without the need to cross the nuclear threshold. In the 1980s, China developed two new computer-guided SRBMs, the single-stage CSS-7 / DF-11 / M-11 and twin-stage CSS-6 / DF-15 / M-9 (M-11 and M-9 are the export designations). Both are solid-fuelled systems transported on an eight wheeled Transporter - Erector - Launcher Vehicle (TEL), and can be readied and launched far more rapidly than liquid-fuelled missiles. The CSS-7/DF-11/M-11 is a replacement for the liquid-fuelled Scud series, and entered service in China in 1992. The longer-range CSS-6/DF-15/M-9 is believed to have entered service in 1991. The DF-15 is designed so that, once launched, the missile body trails behind the separating warhead. This separating warhead system provides camouflage to the warhead, enhancing its chances of penetrating missile defence systems. Both the DF-11 and DF-15 are dual capable, (i.e. they can deliver both conventional and nuclear warheads). The ‘missile tests’ carried out near Taiwan in July 1995, and the exercises in March 1996, involved the firing of DF-15/M-9 SRBMs. In a 1997 report, the U.S. Department of Defense noted that the anti-Taiwan launches into specific missile closure areas “demonstrated a degree of accuracy not previously associated with Chinese missiles.”

Improving Accuracy

In terms of overall accuracy improvements, China is incorporating Global Positioning System (GPS) updates into ballistic missile navigation systems, for example on guidance sets for the DF-15. China also may be working on a new radar-based terminal guidance system for the DF-21 MRBM. This radar-based guidance system would be similar to that employed on the highly-accurate and now defunct U.S. Pershing II missile, all of which were destroyed under the 1987 U.S.-Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. If this proves to be as effective as the Pershing II, such a modification could potentially give the DF-21 an accuracy in the 50 m/164 ft. circular error probable (CEP) range.
Chinese SRBM Exports

Despite official denials from both parties, there is overwhelming evidence that China has exported at least 30 M-11s to Pakistan in contravention of the MTCR. China also appears to have reached an agreement with Iran to supply components and/or production technology to produce the M-11. Some reports suggest that this production technology includes both propellant and guidance system facilities. China is also known to have built a production facility near Semnan in Iran which has been producing Oghab artillery rockets and the Iran-130 BSRBM since 1987. The status of China’s exports of M-9s reportedly made to Syria in 1991 is unclear. A further Chinese programme, the CSS-8 / M-7 (project 8610) SRBM is a modified Russian SA-2 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) with solid-fuelled motors. China embarked on this programme after stealing Soviet SA-2 SAMs destined for North Vietnam via the Chinese rail network in 1966 or 1967 and reverse-engineering them as the HQ-2 SAM. China exported at least 20 CSS-8s to Iran in 1992, although their relatively short range means that they would be useful only in defence of Iranian territory or for limited strikes against neighbouring countries.
Chinese ICBM Capabilities

The most widely circulated estimate is that China maintains four to ten operational DF-5/5A ICBMs. However, this estimate may be dated. Recent credible reports from U.S. sources suggest that China actually fields 17-20 DF-5/5As. This ICBM is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead with a very high explosive yield of 4 to 5 megatons up to 13,000 km/8,060 miles. This missile was initially designed to target the continental United States, but it could be used to cover targets in Europe and the former Soviet Union, as well as North America. Only two Chinese ICBM silos have been identified, both near Luoning in Henan Province in central China. Other Chinese land based strategic missile forces are known to be well dispersed and either road-mobile or located in hardened sites. Such deployments make China’s missile forces hard for an opponent to target and thus highly survivable in the event of an attack, increasing China’s potential political and military leverage in the event of war.
Chinese ICBM Development Programmes

China’s ICBM programme has lagged that of the Former Soviet Union by almost 20 years. The CSS-4/DF-5 did not achieve full operational status until 1981, some ten years after its first successful flight test, and until the early 1990s, China’s ICBM programme appeared to be stalled in the liquid-fuel stage. But China is now developing at least three new nuclear-armed ICBMs as part of its ongoing programme of military modernisation: the combined ICBM and SLBM DF-31/JL-2 programme, and the land-based DF-41. Significantly, these ICBMs differ only in detail from China’s Changzhen (Long March) series of Space Launch Vehicles. Unlike the older CSS-4/DF-5 ICBM, the DF-31/JL-2, and the DF-41 are solid-fuelled systems, and indicate a significant advance in Chinese technical capabilities. The DF-31, one of which was test fired in land-based configuration in May 1995, is a road-mobile, three-stage ICBM with an anticipated range of 8,000 km. It is expected to be ready for service in the 1998-2000 timeframe. According to a classified U.S. Air Force assessment obtained in May 1997 by the Washington Times, the DF-31 “will give China a major strike capability that will be difficult to counterattacks at any stage of its operation, from pre-flight mobile operations through terminal flight phases.” The DF-31 will likely incorporate “design aspects similar to those of current generation Russian missiles,” according to this assessment. Such improvements include “upgraded mobility for the transporter-erector-launcher; advanced materials for the booster and payload, use of penetration aids such as decoys or chaff, and an improved solid propellant.” US sources also suggest that the 1995 DF-31 test included deployment of MIRV. The DF-41, also a three-stage missile, will have a range of some 12,000 km and is scheduled to replace existing CSS-4/DF-5 ICBMs after 2000.
Sea-Based Systems

China has one operational Xia-class nuclear-powered submarine (SSBN) armed with twelve CSS-N-3 (JL-1) SLBMs and one Golf-class conventionally-powered submarine, used initially as a test platform but now apparently deployed as an operational system and armed with two JL-1 SLBMs (the JL-1’s range is 1,700 km/1,054 miles). The JL-1 SLBM, and its land-based counterpart the DF-21 MRBM, are China’s first solid-fuel missiles, an important advance indicating China’s growing technological capabilities. These Chinese SLBMs make it even more difficult for a potential adversary to neutralise China’s strategic nuclear force. China is also developing a new class of SSBN, the Type 094, as well as a follow-on SLBM, the JL-2, with an anticipated range of 8,000 km/4,960 miles. According to a 1997 report by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the Type 094 SSBN will be “the largest submarine ever constructed in China.” It will have improved quieting and sensor systems, and a more reliable propulsion system than the Xia. The initial Type 094 SSBN will be launched early in the next decade, and three boats may be operational by 2010. The Type 094 will carry 16 JL-2s. According to ONI, these SLBMs will enable China to “target portions of the United States for the first time from operating areas located near the Chinese coast.”
Threats to Taiwan

The Chinese missile force is growing and provides Beijing with regional predominance. The Chinese can use this force as a deterrent, to exact bargaining leverage, or for intimidation purposes, as with their “missile tests” against Taiwan. China’s high visibility missile threats directed at Taiwan involved a total of 10 launches, six in 1995 and four in 1996, demonstrating the serious impact ballistic missiles will have on the future regional security environment. Between 21-23 July 1995, the Chinese fired some six nuclear-capable DF-15 SRBMs from Fujian province to an East China Sea impact site 90 miles north of Taipei (one missile reportedly crashed in China due to a guidance system failure). Theses firings, conducted during a period of tensions in U.S.-China-Taiwan relations, had an initial adverse impact on Taiwan’s economy, including a one-day 4.2 percent drop in the stock market, until calm was restored. China launched its second set of “missile tests” on the eve of Taiwan’s first democratic presidential election, firing another four DF-15s (two on 8 March and two on 13 March 1996) into two ocean impact zones that bracketed the island. Three missiles were fired into a closure zone that was 30 nm miles from the southern port of Kaohsiung and the other missile into a zone that was just 19 nm east of near the northern port of Keelung. The Chinese fired the missiles from the Huanan Mountain area. However, for Taiwan, these “missile tests” and related Chinese military manoeuvres caused serious concern and inspired more short-term economic panic. They also seriously impacted air and sea traffic flowing to and from Taiwan producing a virtual blockade. Indeed, subsequent analyses reveal that the March 1996 exercises, including the “missile tests”, constituted the largest multi-service exercise ever conducted in the Taiwan Strait. The exercises were codenamed “Exercise Strait 961” and involved a full-scale contingency scenario for an invasion of Taiwan. These Chinese designed the exercise to show their resolve on the Taiwan sovereignty issue. According to a 1996 unclassified report by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, the Chinese forces taking part in this exercise were: …forces from all three Chinese fleets, ground units, elements of the Second Artillery…, and at least one component of air defense missile troops equipped with the SA-10B [S-300/Grumble] surface-to-air missile. The SA-10B’s presence [Naval Intelligence concluded] was ‘both for exercise play and as a precautionary, defensive measure. The Chinese may have been concerned that Taiwan might miscalculate the nature and intent of the exercise. U.S. analyst Richard Fisher of Washington’s Heritage Foundation has also learned from sources in Washington and Taipei that Beijing was prepared to launch between 20-30 DF-15s, which would have contributed to a serious escalation in regional tensions.

The Threat from India

India’s security environment is dominated by its mistrust of Pakistan, with whom it has fought three wars in the past 40 years, and its competition for regional influence with China, with whom it fought a border war in 1962. A combination of high defence spending (some 15% of total government expenditure in 1992) and considerable technical expertise has made India’s military-industrial base one of the most diversified in the developing world. India’s missile programme is second only to China’s in the developing world. India’s rivalry with Pakistan has also precipitated an accelerating regional arms race in which both ballistic missiles and the two states’ nuclear programmes continue to feature prominently.

After failing to reverse-engineer the Russian SA-2 Guideline Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) as a viable SRBM in the 1970s, India instigated its Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) in 1983 with the aim of achieving self-sufficiency in missile production and development. The establishment of the MTCR in 1987, which could have halted or delayed India’s ballistic missile programme, was seen by the Indian defence establishment as vindicating the IGMDP because key ballistic missile technologies had already been developed indigenously.

The IGMDP comprises five core systems. The Agni (Fire) IRBM and Prithvi (Earth) series of SRBMs were developed in close association with India’s space industry. Other programmes are the Trishul (Trident) short range SAM: the Akash (Sky) Medium Range SAM and the Nag (Cobra) anti-tank guided missile. In addition, India is known to be developing the Sagarika (Oceanic) ship- and submarine-launched cruise missile with a range of some 300 km, and speculation persists about the existence on an ICBM programme known as Surya (Sun). Given the advanced nature of India’s Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) programme, the existence of the Surya system must be a strong possibility.
Short-Range Missiles

The liquid-fuelled, road-mobile Prithvi SRBM uses the basic propulsion technology from an SA-2 SAM and was first tested in February 1988, with both 150 km (SS-150) and 250 km (SS-250) versions nearing production by mid-1994. A third version, the 350 km SS-350 is also at an advanced stage of development. The Prithvi’s liquid fuel is highly volatile however, and has to be loaded immediately prior to launch, so a more stable solid-fuel versions of the Prithvi may also be under development.

The Prithvi’s inertial-guidance package is said to give a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of 250m, although some reports have suggested that one test with a manoeuvring warhead gave a CEP figure of nearer 10m. The fact that Indian scientists are known to be working to integrate the US Global Positioning System (GPS) into its missile guidance packages suggests that the achievement of such a dramatic increase in accuracy may be possible.

India has developed conventional high explosive, cluster munitions and incendiary warheads for the Prithvi. However, many Western analysts contend that the Prithvi has been designed with a nuclear payload in mind. The missile is carried on a Tatra truck-based eight-wheel TEL, four of which, with a total of 16 missiles and associated support equipment, will comprise a regimental-strength unit.

As of October 1995, some 18-20 Prithvi SS-150s had been delivered to the Army by Bharat Dynamics in Hyderabad, and a sophisticated simulator had also been developed to train crews in its operation. Whilst planned production figures are unknown, it was announced in June 1994 that the Indian Army had a requirement for some 75 SS-150s and the Air Force for 25 Prithvi SS-250s. Recent reports have suggested that the Air Force order will only be met once the Army’s has been fulfilled, suggesting that substantial numbers of the SS-250 are unlikely to be operational before 1997. Underlining the status of the Prithvi as a Paksitan-specific weapon, it is intended that the system will be deployed in the Western border states of Kashmir and Punjab. This would place the cities of Hyderabad, Faisalabad, Lahore and Karachi, as well as many of Pakistan’s key military installations, within range of the SS-150 variant. Following a successful test of the Prithvi SS-250 in January, 1996, Indian officials were quoted as saying that the missile would eventually be offered for export.

N. Korea Intermediate-Range Missiles

The Agni IRBM is clearly a strategic missile despite being labeled a ‘technical demonstrator’ by Indian officials. A 2,500 km range IRBM, the two stage missile has been tested three times between 1989 and 1994, the second two tests involving a manoeuvring re-entry vehicle. Although the programme appeared to have been put on hold by by India’s previous Congress-led government, the election in May 1996 of a Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government has brought with it strong suggestions that the programme will be revived.

In early August 1996, Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, scientific adviser to the Indian defence minister, revealed that the Defense Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) had sent a proposal to the prime minister, H.D. Deve Gowda, seeking to resume the Agni test flights programme. And in his Independence Day Address on August 15, Deve Gowda referred to the Agni by name and stressed that the development project would continue. This suggestion was repeated in the Indian Defense Ministry’s 1996-97 annual report published on August 15 1996, which also reiterated that missile development projects would continue despite intense pressure from abroad to shelve them.

If the Agni programme is indeed revived, it will require a further five or six test flights before being ready for production, a process which could be expected to take its in-service date into the next century.

Intercontinental-Range Missiles

Whilst the status of the Surya ICBM programme is unclear, some reports suggest that it is now underway and will be based largely on India’s SLV programme. In 1993, India failed to acquire four cryogenic rocket engines (advanced long-range engines which use low-temperature fuels such as liquid hydrogen and methane) from Russia following intense pressure on Moscow from the US. But in 1994, the Indian government announced in 1994 that it had set aside 3.35 billion rupees ($108 million) to enable the Cryogenic Upper Stage Project to be tested by the end of 1998, and Indian scientists claim that colleagues working in Russia have already acquired drawings of the cryogenic engine.

The Threat from Iran

Iran’s missile programs, fueled by both domestic and foreign technology and aid, has produced systems capable of striking Israel and major sections of Europe.

Today we know, and the bi-partisan, congressionally-appointed Rumsfeld Commission confirmed, “Iran is placing extraordinary emphasis on its ballistic missile and WMD development programs. The ballistic missile infrastructure in Iran is now more sophisticated than that of North Korea, and has benefited from broad, essential, long-term assistance from Russia and important assistance from China as well.”

“Iran is making very rapid progress in developing the Shahab-3 MRBM, which, like the North Korean No Dong, has a range of 1300 km. This missile may be flight tested at any time and deployed soon thereafter.”

The Rumsfeld Commission further reported that Iran has the technical capability to test an ICBM-range missile capable of hitting the United States: “A 10,000 km-range Iranian missile could hold the U.S. at risk in an arc extending northeast of a line from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to St. Paul, Minnesota.”


Iran’s efforts to acquire ballistic missiles commenced at the start of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, when Iraq began launching FROG-7 rockets at Iranian front-line positions and cities in South-Western Iran, particularly Dezful. Between October 1980 and January 1982, Iraq fired some 64 FROGs but having been driven out of Iran in May 1982, switched to using longer range Scud Bs. Between October 1982 and June 1984, Iraq fired some 60 Scuds at South-Western Iranian cities, although with little strategic effect.

Lacking the necessary technological resources to respond to these attacks with an indigenous Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM) programme, Iran turned to China for assistance, acquiring the capability to assemble copies of the Chinese Type-83 artillery rocket at a Chinese-built and equipped plant at Semnan, east of Tehran. Known in Iran as the Oghab, this Type-83 system had a range of only 40 km and a CEP of more than 1,000 metres, limiting its effectiveness to targeting large population centres or military targets. Iran fired a total of 253 Oghabs during the war.

In 1985, Iraq launched a further set of Scud attacks. By now, however, Iran’s limited TBM capability had been augmented by the acquisition of a small number of Scud Bs from Libya and Syria, some 14 of which were fired by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard at Iraq during 1985. Between June and November 1986, Iran fired a further eight Scuds at Iraq, six at the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, and two at oil installations. Following further Iraq attacks in January 1987, Iran responded with 11 further launches against Baghdad, no further missiles being fired until another seven strikes on Baghdad in October.

The War of the Cities

As the small numbers of missiles fired between 1985 and 1988 indicate, Iran possessed only a token missile force. But following the delivery of 100 Scud Bs from North Korea in 1988, Iran fired three Scuds at Baghdad on February 29 1988, their heaviest attack on the Iraqi capital to date.

The following day, however, the scale of the Iraqi response became clear. Iraq’s development of a modified version of the Scud B, the Al Hussein, with a range of some 650 km, had been announced in August 1987, giving Iraq the capability for the first time to target Tehran and other cities in central Iran. But rather than adopting the Iranian tactic of firing small numbers of missiles, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein waited until he had sufficient missiles and launchers to launch a large-scale bombardment of Iran, in what became known as “The War of the Cities”.

Between February 29 and April 20 1988, Iraq fired 189 Al Husseins at Tehran, Isfahan and Qom, causing 8,000 casualties (2,000 fatalities). Despite the relative ineffectiveness of these attacks (approximately a third as effective as the V-2s fired against London during World War II, once the heavier population density of Tehran is taken into account), the psychological effects on ordinary Iranians were considerable - nearly a quarter of the population of Tehran fled the city. But as a result of the lower intensity of the Iranian counterattacks, the 77 Scuds fired by Iran during the same period - 61 of which were aimed at Baghdad - had less effect on the Iraqi population.

Towards and Indigenous Capability

These Iraqi missile attacks were one of the reasons that Iran sued for peace in July 1988. The enduring memory of their psychological effectiveness also explains why Iran has sought to acquire larger quantities of longer range, more accurate TBMs since the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Central to this developing capability has been Iran’s relationships with China, and particularly with North Korea, many of whose TBM development programmes are co-funded by Iran.

The high cost of obtaining TBMs from abroad and the difficulties Iran faced in circumventing the arms embargo also provided a strong stimulus for Iran to seek to develop an indigenous manufacturing capability. Indications that Iran was attempting to establish such a capability appeared to be confirmed in March 1988, when Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani announced that “…mass production of Iranian-made missiles will shortly enable Iran to fire as many as 20 missiles a day into Baghdad….The missiles…have a range of 130 km….the Iranian missiles are not imitations of the SCUD Bs or other missiles.”

By the time the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988, Iran was believed to be pursuing five missile programmes, although with limited success. Work on the first of these, the Mushak 120 (or Iran 130) had begun in 1985 with, it is beleived, assistance from China, North Korea and possibly others. The Mushak 120 appeared to be a new design using a solid-fuel motor and a simple inertial guidance package based on commercially-available civilian technology, and was intended to have a range of 130 km. However technical difficulties with the complex solid-fuel technology meant that the system never achieved an operational range of more than 120 km. Nevertheless, the missile was put into production at the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO) facility at Semnan in early 1988, and several are thought to have been fired at Iraq during the “War of the Cities”.

A longer range variant of the Mushak 120, the 160 km-range Mushak 160, was tested in July 1988, and the existence of a further variant, the 200 km-range Mushak 200 was announced in April 1989. The developmental status of these systems, however, remains unclear and there are strong indications that Iran has failed to solve the problems with its solid-fuel technology that plagued the Mushak 120. Although Iranian officials announced in September 1989 that “production of a particular surface-to-surface missile made in Iran has started”, Iran’s importing of some 200 Chinese CSS-8 SRBMs, a solid-fuelled version of the HQ-2 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) with a range of some 150 km and a 190 kg payload, together with 35 launchers, later in 1989, suggests that the equivalent Mushak systems had not, in fact, achieved operational status.

Longer-Range Capabilities

In parallel to these efforts to develop indigenous TBMs, Iran increased its efforts to obtain longer-range TBMs from abroad. Following the first shipment of 100 North Korean Scud B SRBMs in 1988, a further 200-300 missiles were delivered, and by the early 1990s it was estimated that Iran had accumulated up to 350 Scud Bs, together with some 15 mobile launchers.

The first significant qualitative increase in Iranian missile capability was its acquisition of North Korean Scud Cs, a 500 km variant of the Scud B produced with assistance from China. In November 1990, a North Korean delegation travelled to Tehran for a meeting with the Commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and deliveries of North Korean Scud Cs to Iran began the following year. Iran first tested the system in May 1991 and later the same year Iran began acting as a trans-shipment point for the Scud C’s exported to Syria. By 1994, it was reported that Iran had taken delivery of between 100 and 170 Scud Cs, together with associated tooling and assembly equipment which has been installed at a plant near Hama. However, although some recent reports suggest that this plant can produce entire Scud Cs, it seems more likely that it assembles knock-down kits, with only a limited number of components being manufactured indigenously.

In regional terms, Iran’s possession of the Scud C is significant. Its 550 km range allows Iran to target most of Iraq, Eastern Syria and parts of Eastern Turkey, as well as the Gulf Emirates and many key targets in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, since the missile is normally deployed by North Korea with a chemical warhead, it may be that a transfer of this technology has also taken place, saving Iran years of development time to deploy a chemical warhead of its own.

Iran has gained further capabilities by acquiring Chinese M-11 SRBMs with a range of 300 km. The M-11s’ solid-fuel engines give Iran considerably greater operational flexibility than its older liquid-fuelled Scud Bs and Scud Cs. These Chinese exports may also have included the transfer of some associated production and assembly technologies.

The Nodong 1

More significantly, it is believed that Iran has provided financial assistance for North Korea’s Nodong programme, now nearing series production, and has negotiated agreements to receive some 150 of these 1,000 km range SRBMs, together with production facilities, once development is completed. The Nodong-1, with a range of 1,000 km would give Iran the capability to target almost the entire Middle East, including parts of Israel. However, reports that Japan had applied strong pressure on Tehran to cancel these purchases - including a threat to withhold funding for a major hydroelectric project - place a question mark over Iran’s acquisition plans.

Such doubts appeared to be confirmed by US Army General Binford Peay, Commander of the US Central Command, who reported in April 1996 that an Iranian deal to purchase a number of Nodong-1s had fallen through in March 1996 due to financial difficulties. However General Peay also reported that Iran was building a number of deep tunnels along its Gulf Coastline which he believed were intended as storage or launch sites for the Nodong I once Iran and North Korea reach agreement on its purchase. And given these reports, the legacy of close co-operation between the two states and the investment Iran has made in North Korea’s programmes, it appears likely that both the Nodong1 and longer range North Korean TBMs, the 1,500 km Nodong 2, and the 2,000 km Taepo Dong 1, will find their way into the Iranian arsenal at some time in the future.

Iranian Capabilities: an Assessment

The pattern of Iran’s missile acquisition since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 suggests that Iran’s ultimate goal is the establishment of an indigenous TBM manufacturing capability. Whilst the precise nature of Iran’s current production capabilities is hard to quantify, there is no doubt that it has the ability to assemble complete TBMs from imported kits, and can also build certain major structural and mechanical components. These efforts are concentrated at the Chinese-built plant near Semnan, which began building the Oghab artillery rocket in 1987 and later began assembly of the Mushak 120, and at larger North Korean-built plants at Isfahan and Sirjan which can produce liquid fuels and certain structural components. Another Chinese-built facility near Bandar Abbas produces the Silkworm ASCM, and is at the centre of efforts to extend the Silkworm’s range to 400 km. Iran’s missile test facilities are situated in the North East of the country near Shahroud. Some 100 other facilities produce missile components of different kinds.

Reports from German Customs Intelligence in late 1994 that Iran would be producing Scud Bs using “a significant proportion” of indigenously-manufactured parts by 1995, and that it would attain self-sufficiency “in the coming years” confirm that Iran’s relatively advanced defence infrastructure has given it the ability to assemble TBMs from imported components. However, Iran’s ability to produce TBMs may be limited by a lack of key human resources—designers, technicians, technical writers etc—suggesting that the capability to produce complete missile bodies, engines and key components, particularly guidance systems, is still some way off. Iran also lacks the human infrastructure to design and produce wholly indigenous TBMs without substantial input from foreign personnel. However, given the relative ease with which Iran and other states have obtained sophisticated components, machine tools and foreign assistance in the past, this lack of full indigenous production facilities and infrastructure may not hamper for long Iran’s efforts to acquire a more potent offensive ballistic missile capability.

The Threat from Iraq

Iraq’s programs for building longer range missiles armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, has had a single, deterrent purpose: to present the United States with the likelihood that if it attacked any Arab country in retaliation for terrorist acts, or to protect Israel, American troops in the region, or America’s European friends, would suffer mass destruction.


Iraq’s ballistic missile programme offers a textbook example of the way in which the transfer of technology between nations has enabled developing nations previously reliant on potentially uncertain supplies of entire missile systems from abroad to establish autonomous production capabilities. And whilst Iraq was able to develop such an advanced ballistic missile programme only because of the resources it was prepared to devote to the task, the ease with which it was able to acquire foreign expertise, equipment and technology and the speed with which this programme advanced provides an ominous model for future proliferation patterns amongst other rogue regimes. Using oil revenues to fund a huge missile technology procurement network and exploiting tacit Western backing for Iraq in its war against Iran, Saddam Hussein found that he was able to obtain almost any missile technology, either legally or illegally. He also had no difficulty in recruiting thousands of skilled foreign engineers and technicians. During the 1980s, Iraq established formal contacts with Brazil, China, Egypt, France and the Soviet Union, facilitating the sale of missile technology, joint research programmes and the education of specialist Iraqi personnel. Iraq also reached covert agreements to circumvent international arms control regimes such as the MTCR, with Argentina, Brazil, East Germany, Libya and South Africa.

Iraq also received extensive assistance from Western companies, for whom Iraq represented a lucrative market, often with the tacit co-operation of their governments. An Austrian company, Consultco, designed Iraq’s enormous Sa’ad 16 complex near Mosul which designed and produced modified Scuds, conventional munitions and chemical weapons, as well as housing parts of Iraq’s nuclear programme. West German companies also played a key role in the construction and equipping of this complex. The UK Department of Trade and Industry issued hundreds of export licenses for sensitive military technology sales to Iraq in the latter half of the 1980s, many of which were actively opposed by, or concealed from, the Ministry of Defence. Similarly, export licenses were issued in the United States for military technology sales to Iraq despite the opposition of the Department of Defense. Moreover the British, French, Italian, German and US governments all assisted in financing military contracts between private companies and Iraq despite the existence of self-imposed ‘embargoes’ on the sale of such equipment. Where such tacit government co-operation was not forthcoming, Iraq found no difficulty in disguising the true purpose of its activities. Iraq either deceived the vendor about the real end-use of the equipment to be exported (the sections of barrel for the Gerald Bull-designed ‘Super Gun’ were described as oil piping when they were intercepted by British Customs officials), or persuaded the vendor to co-operate in circumventing export regulations. Iraq disguised other deals through the creation of State Agencies such as the ‘Technical Corps for Special Projects’, which concluded deals with foreign suppliers whilst masking their status as branches of the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialisation. Another Iraqi strategy was to purchase Western companies in order to obtain key military technologies (as with Iraq’s purchase of the British machine tool company Matrix Churchill) or set up front companies abroad that were able to evade restrictions on exports to Iraq. Where none of these methods proved fruitful, Iraq’s extensive network of intelligence agencies either stole military technologies to order from foreign companies or recruited agents from third-party countries to obtain such technology on Iraq’s behalf.

Al Hussein and Al Hijarah

The basis of Iraq’s missile programme lies in 820 Scud B SRBMs and between 20 and 36 Transporter- Erector- Launchers (TELs) it received from the Soviet Union following a deal signed in 1974.

The Iran-Iraq War provided the stimulus for Saddam Hussein to embark on his ambitious programme to extend the range of his ballistic missile arsenal. Tehran, some 500 km from the Iraqi border, was outside the 300 km range of the unmodified Scud B. Efforts to extend the standard Scud B’s range began in the early 1980s as project 144, and in August 1987 Saddam announced that it had successfully tested a longer-range Scud, the Al Hussein, over a range of more than 500 km.

Because Iraq launched no long range missile attacks on Iran between August 1987 and February 1988, Saddam’s claims were viewed with scepticism by Western observers. But following Iran’s attack on Baghdad with three of the Scud Bs it had imported from North Korea on February 29 1988, it rapidly became apparent that Saddam had spent the intervening months quietly building up a sufficient stockpile of Al Hussein to make a major strategic impact on the course of the Iran-Iraq War. Over the following three weeks, in what became known as ‘The War of the Cities’, Iraq fired 189 Al Husseins at Tehran, Isfahan and Qom, causing 8,000 casualties, some 2,000 of which were fatalities. The psychological effects of these attacks on ordinary Iranians were considerable - nearly a quarter of the population of Tehran fled the city, and the attacks were one of the factors contributing to Iran’s decision to sue for peace in July 1988.

The Al Hussein also gave Iraq the ability to hit much of Israel, and Saddam clearly believed that he could repeat the strategic success of his attacks on Iran by forcing Israel to retaliate against Iraq and turning Western - particularly American - public opinion by causing substantial casualties to allied forces. But despite firing some 90 missiles, largely Al Husseins, at targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia, the ability of the coalition forces to take effectiveness countermeasures, particularly the appearance for the first time of active missile defences in the form of the US-manufactured Patriot missile defence system, meant that this strategic gambit proved to be a failure.

Analysis of the Al Husseins fired during the Gulf War revealed that its 600 - 650 km range had been achieved by reducing the warhead weight to around 500 kg to allow an increase in fuel capacity. CEP of the Al Hussein was poor, however, with reports putting it at between 1 km and 3.2 km. The missile could be mounted on an Al-Waleed TEL, a modified Scud B MAZ 543P TEL or a Daimler-Benz trailer known in Iraq as the Al Nida. It also became clear after the Gulf War that two further variants of the Al Hussein, the Al Hussein ‘Short’ and the Al Hijarah, had also been developed by Iraq.

The Al Hussein could be deployed with both conventional HE and binary chemical warheads. In 1995, UNSCOM confirmed that Iraq had also developed biological warheads for the missile, the first developing nation to have achieved such a feat of weaponization. U.N. sources reported that 25 such warheads had been discovered. The Al Hussein was also envisaged as the delivery system for the ‘crash programme’ nuclear weapon that Iraq embarked upon following its invasion of Kuwait in 1990, although the one tone weight of such a warhead would have limited the missile’s range to some 300 km.

After the Gulf War, Iraq declared that it still possessed 51 Al Husseins, 30 of which were armed with CW warheads, six TELs and 32 fixed launch platforms. UNSCOM later reported that Iraq destroyed 78 Al Husseins and the U.N. a further 44. Taking into account the number of Al Husseins fired at Iran during the 1988 ‘War of the Cities’, it can be estimated that Iraq converted a total of some 400-450 Scud Bs to Al Hussein specification.

Although it had been thought that all Iraq’s Al Hussein TBMs were converted from Russian-supplied Scud Bs, the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) have gradually uncovered a missile infrastructure and production base far larger and more advanced than had been believed prior to the Gulf War. Most significantly, UNSCOM revealed in 1996 that Iraq had developed the capability to produce both airframes and engines for the Al Hussein. Thus the total number of Al Husseins built could have been considerably higher than at first thought, accounting for many of the 85 Scud-type TBMs that UNSCOM now believes Iraq has retained. Coupled with the 12-16 TELs that Iraq is also believed to have hidden, these missiles represent a continuing threat to the security of the Middle East.

Al Abbas

The Al Abbas was the second Scud-derived TBM developed by Iraq. First flight tested in April 1988, the missile had a warhead weight reduced to 300 kg and a further increase in liquid fuel capacity to give a range of some 900 km. CEP was reported to be no better than 3 km. The missile was launched from the same Al-Waleed TEL as the Al Hussein.

No Al Abbas TBMs were fired during the Gulf War, suggesting that development had halted around 1990 due to the poor performance of the system. Iraqi technicians were reported to have concluded that an upgraded version of the Al Hussein with improved motor performance and higher energy liquid fuel would give greater range with a larger payload than could be achieved with the Al Abbas.

Longer Range Systems: Al Abid, Tammouz I and Badr 2000

Saddam’s ballistic missile programme was remarkable in that he was able to embark upon multi-stage designs only five years after setting out to acquire a longer-range Scud capability. On 5 December 1989 Iraq launched a 25 meter long rocket that it claimed was the first stage of a multi-stage Space Launch Vehicle (SLV). Known as the Al Abid (or Al Aabed), this first stage used five clustered Al-Hussein motors and reached an altitude of 12,000 metres (40,000 ft) during the test. A video of the launch released by the Iraqis showed a three stage system and although the second and third stages of the system were later revealed to have been dummies, it is believed that the second stage was intended to be a further Al Hussein motor with the third stage derived from a Soviet-supplied SA-2 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM). The Al Abid would thus have weighed some 48 tonnes and carried a payload of some 750 kg, sufficient to deliver a chemical or small nuclear warhead, over a range of at least 2,500 km.

Although development of the Al Abid was never completed, it used proven booster technologies and clustering techniques and could have been expected to enter service in the mid-to-late 1990s had the Gulf War not intervened. Work on the programme has been terminated by post-war UN efforts, but reports suggest that members of the Al Abid team have moved to Libya to work on a long-range delivery system that may incorporate elements of the Iraqi design.

Tammouz 1

On December 14 1989, days after the Al Abid test, Iraq announced the existence of a second long-range system, the Tammouz I. Like the Al Abid, it utilised Iraq’s modified Scud technology for the first stage and was intended to use a modified SA-2 SAM sustainer as a second stage. Despite Iraqi claims to the contrary, the Tammouz was never tested and was still in the development stage when the Gulf War broke out.

Both the Al Abid and Tammouz programmes drew considerably on foreign expertise, particularly from a Brazilian specialist, Major General Hugo de Oliveira Piva. Formerly director of Brazil’s Aerospace Technology Centre and the leader of Brazil’s programme to convert the Sonda IV sounding rocket into a nuclear-capable IRBM, Piva and a 23-man team were hired by Iraq in the late 1980s and were reported to have been assisted by the ‘Super Gun’ designer Dr Gerald Bull. Piva’s team left Iraq on the eve of the 1990 Gulf War, but it is interesting to note that he has since reportedly offered their services to Iran.

Badr 2000

Iraq also played a role in the Condor 2 programme initiated by in Argentina in 1982. A two stage, solid-fuelled missile intended to carry a 450 kg payload (possibly a nuclear warhead) at least 900 km, the project attracted co-funding from Egypt in 1984 and Iraq in 1985. In April 1990, under pressure from the United States, the Argentinean government announced that the project had been shelved due to rising costs. Egypt and Iraq were reported to have ceased their involvement at around the same time.

However since the Gulf War it has emerged that Iraq continued its development of the missile, known as the Badr 2000, until 1990, apparently with the assistance of Pakistani technicians. In 1995, reports appeared suggesting that Iraqi technicians are working in Libya to revive the programme or to integrate it with Libya’s Al Fattah programme.

Current Iraqi Capabilities

Under the terms of the 1991 United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) has a mandate to destroy or make harmless “all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km, and related major parts, and repair and production facilities.”

Iraq has consistently obstructed UNSCOM’s mission and it is clear that Iraq has gone to great lengths to conceal and retain both ballistic missiles and WMD warheads. As UNSCOM Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus said in testimony to the U.S. Permanent Senate Investigations Subcommittee, “I think that they put enormous value to the option of keeping or acquiring nuclear, biological (and) chemical weapons and the capability to deliver them.” Although it is known that 820 Scuds were supplied to Iraq by the former Soviet Union in the 1980 and roughly how many have been fired in action, uncertainty still surrounds the exact number of Scuds fired by Iraq in testing. This difficulty in accounting for Iraq’s missile arsenal was compounded by the discovery in 1996 that Iraq had the capability to produce complete missile airframes and engines indigenously. Public pronouncements from UNSCOM in October 1996 suggest that Iraq may have retained up to 85 Scud-type missiles in defiance of the terms of the Gulf War ceasefire. Israeli military sources, however, maintain that the number may be as many as 100. Yiftar Shafir, an analyst at Tel Aviv’s Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, also estimated in June 1996 that Baghdad could still have around 100 Scuds, both the original 300-km range and the extended 600-km Al-Hussein version. A senior Iraqi defector, General Wafiq al-Samerai, said in July 1996 that he believed that Saddam had retained some 40 Scud-type TBMs. He added that “He also has 255 containers of biological agents. In 230 the agent is in powder form, with no expiry date, and in 25 it is in liquid form, which will deteriorate.”

Post-War Ballistic Missile Development

Despite international sanctions, Iraq’s indigenous missile development programme has remained active. Iraq retains large numbers of Soviet-supplied SA-2 SAMs which can be converted in short-range ballistic missiles (indeed the Soviet manual for the SA-2 contains instructions as to how to achieve this). This practice has strong precedents. The Chinese CSS-8 TBM, sold to Iran, was developed from a Chinese-made version of the SA-2 and Croatia is working on a similar programme. Iraq also has experience in this area. Prior to the Gulf War the Al-Fahd programme was initiated to convert the SA-2 into a 300 km-range TBM, although the project was abandoned in the research and development phase. Given the availability of these SA-2s, considerable efforts have been made to try to ensure that Iraq does not resurrect the Al Fahad programme. Under the terms of the UNSCOM monitoring plan, Iraq is prohibited from using any engines from its Soviet-supplied SA-2 SAMs in ballistic missiles - indeed UNSCOM has tagged all known Iraqi SA-2s in order to ensure that they are not used in this way.

The current focus of Iraq’s missile development efforts is the “Ababil 100” programme which, although based on the SA-2 propulsion system, has been designed from the outset as a surface-to-surface system using inertial guidance. The programme has two systems are under parallel development, both with design ranges no greater than the 150 km permitted under UN Resolution 687. The liquid-fuelled version is now known as the “Al Samoud” (and given the restriction on using SA-2 engines, any engines used in the programme must therefore be reverse-engineered Iraqi models), whilst the solid-fuelled version, which is reported to be proceeding more slowly, retains the name “Ababil 100”. At the same time, Iraq has also been rebuilding its Saad-16 missile research facility at Al Kinde.

It is also clear that Iraq has sought to re-establish its covert procurement network in order to obtain missile technologies from abroad. In 1995, Iraq was able to smuggle gyroscopes from dismantled Russian ICBMs into the country. A second shipment of 115 gyroscopes were discovered in Jordan in October 1995. UNSCOM sources said that the gyroscopes were found to be incompatible with Iraqi missiles so they were discarded.

Iraqi Ballistic Missiles: an Assessment

Although the UN may have destroyed much of Iraq’s ballistic missile infrastructure, it cannot destroy the mountain of knowledge and human expertise that grew up alongside it. Neither has the UN been able to eliminate completely Iraq’s Pre-War missile inventory. In the short term, then, Iraq will continue to pose a limited threat to the region with missiles that may be armed with WMD warheads. But given its past success at circumventing international controls, it would be foolish to believe that Iraq will not recover a substantial 300 - 600 km-range ballistic missile capability in the next ten years. Should these controls prove as porous as they have in the past, the legacy of Iraq’s advanced pre-Gulf War programmes offers a strong indication that this threat may extend into the 2,000 - 4,000 km bracket, placing much of Europe, including the UK, at risk of attack by ballistic missiles armed with chemical and biological weapons.

The Threat from North Korea

Like Communist China, North Korea has already demonstrated, with its test launch of the Taepo Dong I rocket in August 1999, that it is serious about developing nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.

* The Taepo Dong I missile is capable of traveling much farther than first predicted.
* The Taepo Dong II, North Korea’s next generation missile, is now seen as capable of hitting not merely Alaska—repository of 25% of U.S. oil reserves—and Hawaii, but also the western states of Washington, Oregon, California and Nevada.
* And lest anyone forget, this heavy investment in nuclear weaponry occurs at a time when North Korea’s citizens are reportedly grossly malnourished or starving to death.
* A North Korean defector, Colonel Choi Ju-hwal, explained at a 1997 U.S. Senate hearing why North Korea is developing nuclear missiles: “If war breaks out in the Korean peninsula, the North’s main target will be the U.S. forces based in the South (Korea) and Japan, which is the reason the North has been working furiously on its missile program.” Colonel Choi also testified that the “ultimate goal for the development of North Korean missiles is to reach the mainland of the United States.”
* In 1994, North Korea threatened to turn Seoul and Tokyo into a “sea of glass”—an expression that implies the use of a nuclear weapon—if the U.S. held its annual military exercises with its ally, South Korea, and insisted on continuing inspections of its nuclear weapons programs. Subsequently, the U.S. offered to suspend its inspections and build North Korea two new 1000-Megawatt nuclear reactors in exchange for a promise of better behavior.
* All of this raises troubling questions. What will deter China and North Korea from using their military or nuclear arsenals to achieve their strategic objectives? How would the United States respond to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or a North Korean invasion of the South?
* Would the U.S. resist such an invasion, launched using only conventional forces, if it were preceded by threats of the nuclear destruction of Los Angeles, or San Francisco, or Prudhoe Bay, Alaska?
* Absent even a limited missile defense U.S. policymakers would have to pause and consider the consequences.

Even before being deployed, North Korea´s missiles had already achieved the objectives for which the country´s rulers built them, namely blackmail of South Korea, Japan, and the US. For fear of North Korea´s incipient missiles and nuclear weapons, these three countries have supplied the food and fuel that the bankrupt North Korean regime could neither produce nor buy, and thus have kept that regime afloat. For North Korean leaders to actually fire missiles at the US, Japan, or South Korea would be madness. Yet American, Japanese, and South Korean leaders deem it more prudent to pay ransom than to test the North Koreans’ sanity.

Just as important, the presence of an uncontested North Korean missile threat encourages Japan to seek alternatives to the military protection of the United States—the very foundation of the longest peace that the Pacific region has ever known.

The Threat from Pakistan

The Pakistani missile and nuclear programs were substantially assisted by China, to strengthen India’s rival in the sub-continent. For example, although although both parties deny the claim, it is thought the there were 34 M-11 missiles exported to Pakistan from China in 1993. Pakistanis, in turn, have assisted missile programs of Muslim countries in the mideast.

The Threat from Russia

The collapse and reconstitution of the Soviet Union did not mean its disarmament. The arsenal inherited by Russia has since been modernized and expanded, and continues to pose the single greatest strategic threat to the United States.

* The Soviets’ massive investments in nuclear-war fighting capability remain at the disposal of the Russian government. Because of its sheer size, the Russian nuclear arsenal remains the single greatest threat to U.S. security.
* Russia possesses and continues to modernize a huge nuclear arsenal—-thousands of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). Though at approximate parity with the U.S. in strategic nuclear arms, Russia retains a substantial lead in non-strategic nuclear weapons, some 8-15,000 to 300.
* Unfortunately for the United States, current Russian military development—-at least concerning its nuclear forces—-resembles that of the old Soviet Union more than a new democratic Russia.
* The rise of ex-KGB operative Vladimir Putin as President and former KGB chief Yevgeny Primakov as a major political figure suggests that the political developments the West hoped for will be slow to arrive—if they arrive at all.
* Russian scientist Yuri Solomonov, in an interview in the Nezavisimaya Gazeta newspaper in February 1999, boasted that the new Russian Topol-M rocket was the most advanced Russian strategic missile ever made.
* Reports that the control of the Russian nuclear arsenal is breaking down cannot be taken lightly. Should a missile or warhead get into the hands of rogue elements of the Russian military, a launch upon the United States is not impossible.
* The situation may be even more dangerous. In January 1995, President Boris Yeltsin activated his nuclear briefcase, based on the false warning that a Norwegian space rocket was a U.S. missile attack.
* Even a benign Russia that miscalculates can destroy America in less than half an hour.

US - Soviet missile warfare.

Through the 1960s and most of the 1970s, the accuracy of missiles improved, as did the capacity for miniaturizing nuclear warheads. But, as regards long range missiles, US and Soviet designers made different uses of these technologies. The Americans concentrated on packing onto each missile the capacity to spread as much destruction as possible on “soft targets” such as Soviet population and industry—-the better to deter war. A typical US missile was the Poseidon, which carried up to 14 relatively inaccurate warheads each with the explosive power of 40 kilotons. The Soviets concentrated on packing into each missile the combination of explosive power and accuracy to destroy American “hard targets” - missiles, submarines, and bombers, the better to fight and win war. The typical Soviet missile was the SS-18, with 10 accurate warheads each with 500 kilotons of explosive power. In short, the Soviets simply regarded missiles as better artillery, whose job it is to break holes in the enemy’s front lines and to destroy the enemy’s command and supplies in the rear.

The plans for US — Soviet missile warfare — that happily never took place — would have involved this asymmetry: the Soviet missiles destroying as many of the American missiles as possible in a first strike, and the Americans retaliating by killing as many Soviet citizens and destroying as much Soviet industry as possible. The unresolved question was what the Soviets would then do with the missiles that remained in their arsenal. Note that the Soviet plans for offensive missile warfare focused on destroying American missiles. Hence Soviet offensive plans intended to achieve protection of the Soviet Union. By contrast, U

Registruj se da bi učestvovao u diskusiji. Registrovanim korisnicima se NE prikazuju reklame unutar poruka.
  • Pridružio: 21 Sep 2006
  • Poruke: 185

Manje - vise je poznata i ona izjava g-dina Henry Kissinger- a :

" ...Biti neprijatelj Amerike je opasno po zivot .
Al` biti prijatelj je - pogubno ! "

Da li je potrebno i neko ime ?

  • Pridružio: 06 Nov 2010
  • Poruke: 11872
  • Gde živiš: Vranje

Zašto morate da idete do amerikosa, da bi saznali kako rečenica utiče...

Jedan policijski službenik je pitao kraljicu Dragu, "pa gde ste vi za kraljicu..." i to je bilo dovoljno da ne pristane na razvod od kralja... a dalje znamo šta je sve bilo, od učestvovanja Srbije u prvom svetskom ratu, preko formiranja Kraljevine Jugoslavije, do dana današnjih...

  • ikan 
  • Elitni građanin
  • Pridružio: 03 Feb 2013
  • Poruke: 1564

Možeš li ovaj tekst da prevedeš na srpski?
Jeste MyCity, al to je jedna reč (tj. dve), ovo je već poduhvat čitati na stranjskom jeziku.

  • RJ 
  • SuperModerator
  • Gavrilo Milentijević
  • Komandir stanice milicije Gornje Polje
  • Pridružio: 12 Feb 2005
  • Poruke: 30005
  • Gde živiš: ovalni kabinet

A gde vi iščupaste tekst iz 2006 i to još od čoveka koji je udaljen sa foruma pre 10 godina ?

Ko je trenutno na forumu

Ukupno su 413 korisnika na forumu :: 16 registrovanih, 1 sakriven i 396 gosta   ::   [ Administrator ] [ Supermoderator ] [ Moderator ] :: Detaljnije

Najviše korisnika na forumu ikad bilo je 2918 - dana 22 Nov 2019 07:48

Korisnici koji su trenutno na forumu:
Korisnici trenutno na forumu: 4channer, 8u47, _commandos_, aleksmajstor, Arhiv, bojank, GreenMan, kybonacci, Milan A. Nikolic, miljannis, Mixelotti, nradukic, Panonsky, slonic_tonic, Srki94, SsssssNOVI