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Citat:- Vauhnik je s Mihailovićem i potonjim generalom Šarlom de Golom završio specijalizaciju u čuvenoj Ratnoj školi u Francuskoj.
Mozes zaboraviti ceo tekst, ako neko napise gore navedenu glupost
Verovatno je teziste teksta "pobratim Draza"
Citat:As usual, the best of the many warnings came from Admiral Canaris’ Abwehrthrough Colonel Oster. In this case, the Yugoslav Military Attache in Berlin,Colonel Vladimir Vauhnik, was the immediate recipient. He also served Britishintelligence. The “amazingly comprehensive and correct” quality of Vauhnik’sknowledge of German military and political plans is verified by Schellenberg who had him under close surveillance in order to ferret out his sources for hisreports that the Germans were intercepting in Belgrade. Vauhnik was arrestedtwo days before the invasion of Yugoslavia, but managed to misdirect Schellen-berg’s suspicions away from his key source, Oster.
izvor: Barton Whale; "STRATAGEM Deception and Surprise in War" str 280
Citat:The first hints that Germany would attack the Soviet Union reached Vauhnik from two sources. Toward the end of 1940, he learned from Reichsmarshal Goring that by spring Germany would have at its command more than 200 air divisions. Where was he going to use all this airpower? Against Britain he would need 50 air divisions,
at most, in Africa no more than 6. Where did he think he would need 200? Vauhnik remembered hearing that Molotov had infuriated the Nazis during his visit to Berlin in November, 1940. Perhaps Hitler was planning to attack Russia. A few weeks later, early in 1941, Vauhnik learned from the Slovak military attach^, Major Tatarko, that Germany, in preparation for an attack on Russia, had asked Slovakia for 2 infantry divisions. From a network of his fellow Slovenes who worked on German roads and railroads and in German factories Colonel Vauhnik picked up other bits and pieces of information about preparations for the march to the east.
Other sources were Count Sigismund Bernstorff and his cousin Albert. They often spoke of the possibility of war between Germany and the Soviet Union. One day Count Albert, in a communicative mood, forgot himself so much as to tell Vauhnik that a "German attack against Soviet Russia was no longer a mere possibility but a
fact. The decision has already been made."
Still another source was Vauhnik's friend Willy Pabst. Once a major on the German general staff, he had abandoned his military career for business. Whenever his former colleagues, now highranking officers, came to Berlin they liked to visit Willy, a delightful host. He in turn often dined at Vauhnik's home, and thus the information
brought by Pabst's friends found its way to Vauhnik's table.Some time during the second week of March, Pabst became very explicit. Preparations for the attack against Russia were in full swing, he said. Materials were on their way, airfields ready. He sighed as he passed the information to Vauhnik. "My friend," he said, his chin
on his chest, his whole body slumped in his chair, "my friend, this means the end of Germany/'
The next day Vauhnik learned through a German informant that operations would start during the second half of May and that 200 German divisions would engage the Russians,
At this point Vauhnik, convinced he had something more than well-verified rumors, passed his information on to Belgrade, to both the Yugoslav general staff and to Prince Paul's first aide-de-camp.Although his coded messages contained data on German troop movements,with names and registered numbers of German divisions, the
general staff never acknowledged their receipt and never referred to the information either in replies to Vauhnik or in special bulletins.When he realized he was getting no reaction from the general staff, Vauhnik asked Andric, the Yugoslav minister in Berlin, to relay the information to Cincar-Markovic, in the hope that he would find it
useful in his negotiations with the Germans, Perhaps, he reasoned, if the government could convince the Germans they had nothing to fear from Yugoslavia, there would be less chance of a German attack
izvor: Hoptner; "yugoslavia in crisis 1934-1941" str. 231-33
Takodje, sam Vauhnik je pisao o svome radu "Ten Years since Dismemberment of Yugoslavia" (objavljeno u "Dokumenti o Jugoslaviji" No. 2, pp. 23-26. Paris, 1951
Vladimir Vauhnik: „Nevidljivi front - borba za očuvanje Jugoslavije", „Iskra", Minhen, 1984.
Vladimir Vauhnik, polkovnik VKJ, brigadni general JVvD (četniški) – vojaški ataše VKJ in tajni sodelavec britanskega IS
http://users.volja.net/marijankr/dok/LSO-vauhnik.pdf
Citat:Pukovnik Vladimir Vauhnik, ataše u
Berlinu, slao je najpreciznije podatke. Prva njegova vijest je
uslijedila odmah poslije sjednice kod Hitlera, 28. ožujka. Od tada,
depeše iz Berlina stižu neprestano, svaka s točnim podacima.
Sami Nijemci su kasnije, otkrivši Vauhnikovo djelovanje, bili
zaprepašteni njegovim podacima. Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, šef
Kancelarije za inozemnu i kontraobavještajnu službu njemačke
Vrhovne komande, obavještavao je — čini se — Vauhnika preko
svog pomoćnika general-majora Hansa Osterà. U noći 1. i 2.
travnja Vauhnik je od svojih izvora obaviješten da je »napad na
Jugoslaviju definitivno određen za 6. travanj«, kad će uslijediti
»opkoljavajući napadi iz Bugarske, s istoka, i Mađarske, sa
sjevera«, što je odmah prenio Beogradu. Začudo, ondašnji vojni
ministar u Simovićevom kabinetu, general Bogoljub Ilić, kasnije je
tvrdio da Vauhnikovu depešu nikad nije vidio, niti je za nju u ratu
čuo. No, kako god mu drago, Lohr je znao za Vauhnika.
Sudjenje Generalu Lohru
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