Iran

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Релативно објективан текст британског Гардијана на ову тему:

Gulf crisis: story began with UK's seizure of Iranian-flagged ship in Gibraltar

Grace 1 was impounded over claim it was bound for Syria – but diplomats knew there might be consequences

Patrick Wintour Diplomatic editor

Sat 20 Jul 2019 00.26 BST Last modified on Sat 20 Jul 2019 04.46 BST



The Stena Impero and its crew of more than 20 are now in the hands of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Photograph: Stena Bulk/AP

The morning after a group of 30 Royal Marines helped seize the Iranian-flagged Grace 1 in Gibraltar, tired Foreign Office officials did not look exactly jubilant. There was not exactly a sense of foreboding, but diplomats were aware of the wider bilateral consequences for British-Iranian relations.

Now, with the capture of a British-owned oil tanker in the Gulf, some of their worst fears have been realised. The Stena Impero and its crew of more than 20 are now in the hands of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards – and the UK has been shown to be unable to protect British shipping going through the waterways of the strait of Hormuz.

The British insist that they only impounded Grace 1 due its suspected destination – a port in Syria – not due to the fact that the ship was carrying Iranian oil. European Union sanctions against the regime of Bashir al Assad regime were there to be enforced and international law upheld, the British argued. There seemed little doubt, given its circuitous route, that the ship was bound for Syria.

Yet there were some oddities to the British decision. Few previous shipments of oil to Syria have been impounded. The Spanish claim that the British acted under the instruction of the Americans. The Trump administration is trying to freeze all Iranian oil exports as part of its policy of maximum economic sanctions designed to force the Iranians to reopen talks on the nuclear deal signed in 2015.

But Britain opposes that US policy, arguing that it is counterproductive and only likely to strengthen the hands of hardliners in Tehran.

Carl Bildt, the former Swedish prime minister and co-chair of the European council on foreign relations, pinpointed the ambiguities of the British action in Gibraltar: “The legality of the UK seizure of a tanker heading for Syria with oil from Iran intrigues me. One refers to EU sanctions against Syria, but Iran is not a member of the EU. And the EU as a principle doesn’t impose its sanctions on others. That’s what the US does.”

To the Iranian eye, the British action had nothing to do with an EU embargo, and everything to do with an desire to support the US squeeze on Iranian oil exports, the quickest route to bringing the Iranian economy to its knees. Some reports estimate that Iranian exports are down to 200,000 barrels a month.

Britain’s efforts to extricate itself started to emerge at the weekend, when Jeremy Hunt, the foreign secretary, rang his Iranian opposite number, Javad Zarif, and said the ship could be released if there was an undertaking that the ship would no longer travel to Syria.

But trust between Hunt and Zairif is low: Zarif feels let down by Hunt on a range of bilateral issues, including the case of Nazaninin Zaghari-Ratcliffe, the Iranian dual national imprisoned in Tehran.

On a lightning tour of New York this week, Zarif insisted that Grace 1 was not bound for Syria, but to another destination in the Meditternnean that hewould not identify. He refused to give the assurances that Hunt had sought, saying Iran was not going to reveal how it was trying to avoid the US oil embargo.

But the British clearly thought a deal was possible, and pressure was coming from Britain’s European partners to settle the issue. Hunt asked Gibraltar’s chief minister, Fabian Picardo, to come to the UK at short notice to meet not just Theresa May, but Boris Johnson and himself. Talks were also held between Iranian officials and Gibraltar in the foreign office on Thursday.

Picardo continued to insist that the talks had been constructive. Some kind of diplomatic form of words seemed imminent that would satisfy all but the US.

Instead – to the frustration of the Iranians – at a briefing hearing on Friday morning, the Gibraltar court extended the detention of the Grace 1 for 30 days. The 2.1m barrels of oil remain in British hands.

The process had been held against a backdrop of increasing threats from Iran that it would respond in kind to what it saw as “an act of piracy, pure and simple”.

These warnings in some cases were not veiled, but explicit. Although the British were trying to increase the scale of Royal Navy maritime protection to British merchant shipping, the progress was inevitably slow.

In the end, the British-flagged tanker was a sitting duck, and now the consequences are plain for all to see. Not just oil, but crew are now hostage, and diplomats can only ponder in retrospect whether the right judgments were made.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/20/gulf.....ran-hormuz

Чак ни Британци не покушавају бранити нешто што се бранити не може.

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@4 Channer Izgleda da si ipak u pravu ali po drugom osnovu. Biće da se u moreuzu od međunarodnog tranzitnog značaja kakav je Gibraltar primenjuje deo 3 konvencije (ono što sam prethodno citirao je bilo iz dela 2 i odnosi se na obične teritorijalne vode) po kome brodovi u takvim tesnacima uživaju pravo tranzitnog prolaza sličnom pravu vožnje po međunarodnom moru. Dakle tu eksplicitno ne bi trebalo da bude na snazi pravo neškodljivog prolaza o kome smo dosad govorili - a u pravu si jer ovde konkretno nema klauzule po kojoj država pored tesnaca može da donosi zakone koje brodovi u prolazu moraju da poštuju a koji se tiču carinske politike - ako nema ukrcavanja ili iskrcavanja problematične robe.

Citat:PART III
STRAITS USED FOR INTERNATIONAL
NAVIGATION
SECTION 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 34
Legal status of waters forming straits used for international navigation
1. The regime of passage through straits used for international
navigation established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the legal
status of the waters forming such straits or the exercise by the States
bordering the straits of their sovereignty or jurisdiction over such waters and
their air space, bed and subsoil.
2. The sovereignty or jurisdiction of the States bordering the straits is
exercised subject to this Part and to other rules of international law.
Article 35
Scope of this Part
Nothing in this Part affects:
(a) any areas of internal waters within a strait, except where the
establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method
set forth in article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters
areas which had not previously been considered as such;
(b) the legal status of the waters beyond the territorial seas of States
bordering straits as exclusive economic zones or high seas; or
(c) the legal regime in straits in which passage is regulated in whole or
in part by long-standing international conventions in force
specifically relating to such straits.
Article 36
High seas routes or routes through exclusive economic zones
through straits used for international navigation
This Part does not apply to a strait used for international navigation if
there exists through the strait a route through the high seas or through an
exclusive economic zone of similar convenience with respect to navigational
and hydrographical characteristics; in such routes, the other relevant Parts of
this Convention, including the provisions regarding the freedoms of
navigation and overflight, apply.
SECTION 2. TRANSIT PASSAGE
Article 37
Scope of this section
This section applies to straits which are used for international navigation
between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.
Article 38
Right of transit passage
1. In straits referred to in article 37, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right
of transit passage, which shall not be impeded; except that, if the strait is
formed by an island of a State bordering the strait and its mainland, transit
passage shall not apply if there exists seaward of the island a route through
the high seas or through an exclusive economic zone of similar convenience
with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics.
2. Transit passage means the exercise in accordance with this Part of
the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous
and expeditious transit of the strait between one part of the high seas or an
exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive
economic zone. However, the requirement of continuous and expeditious
transit does not preclude passage through the strait for the purpose of
entering, leaving or returning from a State bordering the strait, subject to the
conditions of entry to that State.
3. Any activity which is not an exercise of the right of transit passage
through a strait remains subject to the other applicable provisions of this
Convention.
Article 39
Duties of ships and aircraft during transit passage
1. Ships and aircraft, while exercising the right of transit passage, shall:
(a) proceed without delay through or over the strait;
(b) refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of States bordering
the strait, or in any other manner in violation of the principles
of international law embodied in the Charter of the United
Nations;
(c) refrain from any activities other than those incident to their
normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless
rendered necessary by force majeure or by distress;
(d) comply with other relevant provisions of this Part.
2. Ships in transit passage shall:
(a) comply with generally accepted international regulations,
procedures and practices for safety at sea, including the
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea;
(b) comply with generally accepted international regulations,
procedures and practices for the prevention, reduction and
control of pollution from ships.
3. Aircraft in transit passage shall:
(a) observe the Rules of the Air established by the International
Civil Aviation Organization as they apply to civil aircraft; state
aircraft will normally comply with such safety measures and
will at all times operate with due regard for the safety of
navigation;
(b) at all times monitor the radio frequency assigned by the
competent internationally designated air traffic control authority
or the appropriate international distress radio frequency.
Article 40
Research and survey activities
During transit passage, foreign ships, including marine scientific research
and hydrographic survey ships, may not carry out any research or survey
activities without the prior authorization of the States bordering straits.
Article 41
Sea lanes and traffic separation schemes in straits
used for international navigation
1. In conformity with this Part, States bordering straits may designate
sea lanes and prescribe traffic separation schemes for navigation in straits
where necessary to promote the safe passage of ships.
2. Such States may, when circumstances require, and after giving due
publicity thereto, substitute other sea lanes or traffic separation schemes for
any sea lanes or traffic separation schemes previously designated or
prescribed by them.
3. Such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes shall conform to
generally accepted international regulations.
4. Before designating or substituting sea lanes or prescribing or
substituting traffic separation schemes, States bordering straits shall refer
proposals to the competent international organization with a view to their
adoption. The organization may adopt only such sea lanes and traffic
separation schemes as may be agreed with the States bordering the straits,
after which the States may designate, prescribe or substitute them.
5. In respect of a strait where sea lanes or traffic separation schemes
through the waters of two or more States bordering the strait are being
proposed, the States concerned shall cooperate in formulating proposals in
consultation with the competent international organization.
6. States bordering straits shall clearly indicate all sea lanes and traffic
separation schemes designated or prescribed by them on charts to which due
publicity shall be given.
7. Ships in transit passage shall respect applicable sea lanes and traffic
separation schemes established in accordance with this article.
Article 42
Laws and regulations of States bordering straits
relating to transit passage
1. Subject to the provisions of this section, States bordering straits may
adopt laws and regulations relating to transit passage through straits, in
respect of all or any of the following:
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic,
as provided in article 41;
(b) the prevention, reduction and control of pollution, by giving
effect to applicable international regulations regarding the
discharge of oil, oily wastes and other noxious substances in the
strait;
(c) with respect to fishing vessels, the prevention of fishing,
including the stowage of fishing gear;
(d) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person
in contravention of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
laws and regulations of States bordering straits.
2. Such laws and regulations shall not discriminate in form or in fact
among foreign ships or in their application have the practical effect of
denying, hampering or impairing the right of transit passage as defined in this
section.
3. States bordering straits shall give due publicity to all such laws and
regulations.
4. Foreign ships exercising the right of transit passage shall comply
with such laws and regulations.
5. The flag State of a ship or the State of registry of an aircraft entitled
to sovereign immunity which acts in a manner contrary to such laws and
regulations or other provisions of this Part shall bear international
responsibility for any loss or damage which results to States bordering straits.
Article 43
Navigational and safety aids and other improvements
and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution
User States and States bordering a strait should by agreement cooperate:
(a) in the establishment and maintenance in a strait of necessary
navigational and safety aids or other improvements in aid of
international navigation; and
(b) for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from ships.
Article 44
Duties of States bordering straits
States bordering straits shall not hamper transit passage and shall give
appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation or overflight within or over
the strait of which they have knowledge. There shall be no suspension of
transit passage.

Međutim ne zaboravimo da je Iran pre britanske zaplene tankera počinio čist kriminal oružanim napadima na 6 tankera u Zalivu i u Fudžeiri (sa snimaka i fotografija se vidi da je bar na jednom od brodova bila upotrebljena prilepna mina koja odgovara onim koje imaju Iranci i da nije eksplodirala, a da su je Iranci uklonili). Da to nije bila njihova mina izašli bi u javnost sa tom minom kao korpus deliktijem da oni nisu iza toga i možda utvrdili ko jeste. Ovako samo kažu "nismo mi" bez ikakvih dokaza da podupru takvu izjavu dok suprotna strana ima snimke i ostatak mine...

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Поједини Британци су свесни да су их Амери насанкали и гурнули у ватру:

How Trump’s arch-hawk lured Britain into a dangerous trap to punish Iran

Simon Tisdall

With the seizure of a supertanker off Gibraltar, distracted UK government was set up by John Bolton as collateral damage

Sat 20 Jul 2019 16.38 BST Last modified on Sat 20 Jul 2019 22.50 BST



British-flagged Stena Impero has been held by Iran which is a constant target of US national security adviser John Bolton. Composite: AP

John Bolton, White House national security adviser and notorious Iraq-era hawk, is a man on a mission. Given broad latitude over policy by Donald Trump, he is widely held to be driving the US confrontation with Iran. And in his passionate bid to tame Tehran, Bolton cares little who gets hurt – even if collateral damage includes a close ally such as Britain.

So when Bolton heard British Royal Marines had seized an Iranian oil tanker off Gibraltar on America’s Independence Day, his joy was unconfined. “Excellent news: UK has detained the supertanker Grace I laden with Iranian oil bound for Syria in violation of EU sanctions,” he exulted on Twitter.

Bolton’s delighted reaction suggested the seizure was a surprise. But accumulating evidence suggests the opposite is true, and that Bolton’s national security team was directly involved in manufacturing the Gibraltar incident. The suspicion is that Conservative politicians, distracted by picking a new prime minister, jockeying for power, and preoccupied with Brexit, stumbled into an American trap.

In short, it seems, Britain was set up.

The consequences of the Gibraltar affair are only now becoming clear. The seizure of Grace I led directly to Friday’s capture by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards of a British tanker, the Stena Impero, in the Strait of Hormuz. Although it has not made an explicit link, Iran had previously vowed to retaliate for Britain’s Gibraltar “piracy”. Now it has its revenge.

As a result, Britain has been plunged into the middle of an international crisis it is ill-prepared to deal with. The timing could hardly be worse. An untested prime minister, presumably Boris Johnson, will enter Downing Street this week. Britain is on the brink of a disorderly exit from the EU, alienating its closest European partners. And its relationship with Trump’s America is uniquely strained.

Much of this angst could have been avoided. Britain opposed Trump’s decision to quit the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, the trigger for today’s crisis. It has watched with alarm as the Trump-Bolton policy of “maximum pressure”, involving punitive sanctions and an oil embargo, has radicalised the most moderate Iranians.

Yet even as Britain backed EU attempts to rescue the nuclear deal, Theresa May and Jeremy Hunt, foreign secretary, tried to have it both ways – to keep Trump sweet. They publicly supported Washington’s complaints about Iran’s “destabilising” regional activities and missile programme, and berated Iran when it bypassed agreed nuclear curbs.

Crucially, the government failed to significantly beef up protection for British-flagged vessels transiting the Gulf after attacks in May and June. This was partly because a depleted Royal Navy lacks capacity to mount adequate patrols. But it was also because officials feared that by raising its military profile, Britain could be sucked into armed conflict with Iran.

For Bolton, however, drawing Britain unambiguously in on America’s side was a desirable outcome. So when US spy satellites, tasked with helping block Iranian oil exports in line with Trump’s global embargo, began to track Grace I on its way, allegedly, to Syria, Bolton saw an opportunity.

The Spanish newspaper, El Pais, citing official sources, takes up the story: “The Grace 1, which flies a Panamanian flag, had been under surveillance by US satellites since April, when it was anchored off Iran. The supertanker, full to the brim with crude oil, was too big for the Suez Canal, and so it sailed around the Cape of Good Hope before heading for the Mediterranean.

“According to the US intelligence services, it was headed for the Syrian oil refinery of Banias. Washington advised Madrid of the arrival of the supertanker 48 hours ahead of time, and the Spanish navy followed its passage through the Strait of Gibraltar. It was expected to cross via international waters, as many Iranian vessels do without being stopped.”

Although Spanish officials, speaking after the event, said they would have intercepted the ship “if we had had the information and the opportunity”, Spain took no action at the time. But Bolton, in any case, was not relying on Madrid. The US had already tipped off Britain. On 4 July, after Grace I entered British-Gibraltar territorial waters, the fateful order was issued in London – it is not known by whom – and 30 marines stormed aboard.

Iran’s reaction was immediate and furious. It claimed Britain had acted illegally because the EU embargo on oil supplies to Syria, which Hunt claimed to be upholding, applied only to EU states and not to third countries such as Iran. In any case, Tehran said, the ship’s destination was not Syria.

Iran’s outrage was shared, to a lesser degree, by Josep Borrell, Spain’s socialist foreign minister. Borrell resented the British incursion into Gibraltar’s territorial waters, which Madrid does not recognise. He also appears to have been annoyed that Spain was drawn in – in Tehran, the Spanish ambassador had been summonsed by the foreign ministry to explain Madrid’s role. His reaction was to distance Spain from the affair. The Iranian tanker had been seized “following a request from the United States to the United Kingdom,” he said. And even though Britain was supposedly upholding EU regulations, the External Action Service, the EU’s foreign policy arm, has remained silent throughout.

Iran’s retaliation in snatching the Stena Impero has further exposed Britain’s diplomatic isolation and its military and economic vulnerability. The government has advised British ships to avoid the Strait of Hormuz, an admission it cannot protect them. But between 15 and 30 British-flagged tankers transit the strait each day. If trade is halted, the impact on energy prices may be severe.

Hunt’s appeal for international support for Britain has so far fallen on deaf ears, France and Germany excepted. China, Japan and other countries that rely on oil from the Gulf show no sign of helping. The US plan for a multinational coalition to protect Gulf shipping has few takers. Meanwhile, Trump’s promise to back Britain has scant practical value – and carries inherent dangers.

The Bolton gambit succeeded. Despite its misgivings, Britain has been co-opted on to the front line of Washington’s confrontation with Iran. The process of polarisation, on both sides, is accelerating. The nuclear deal is closer to total collapse. And by threatening Iran with “serious consequences”, without knowing what that may entail, Britain blindly dances to the beat of Bolton’s war drums.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/20/brit.....ohn-bolton

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Iranska BPL snimala američki ratni brod

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Citat:Британска обавештајна служба МИ-6 и Центар за владине комуникације Велике Британије (GCHQ) проверавају верзију да Русија може бити умешана у иранску заплену танкера „Стена имперо“, тврди таблоид „Сандеј мирор“, позивајући се на неименоване изворе.

rs.sputniknews.com/rusija/2019072111204150.....nikacije-/

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Istog dana kada je Stena Impero zaplenjen, UK je bilo produžilo rok zaplene Grejs 1 za još 30 dana. Stena Impero je zaplenjen u 16:30 GMT, produžetak je objavljen bar tri sata pre toga. Dakle zaplena je iranski odgovor.
https://www.rferl.org/a/gibraltar-extends-detentio.....64941.html

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Sunday mirror je pouzdan izvor kao Pogledi.

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pein ::Iranska BPL snimala američki ratni brod

Samo da im pokažu da mogu.
A malo da ih i osramote, ispada taj Aegis smeće, ne vidi BPL "tehnlološki nazadne" nacije na 5 km.

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Могао је БПЛ бити у Иранском ВАПу а брод у међународним водама па га не смије дирати? Уосталом, недавно се спомињало неко обарање Иранског дрона.