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Napisano: 19 Dec 2017 15:58
Tako je LT to je neosporivo ali niko ovde ne priča koji je razlog tog manjka. U RAND publikaciji se lepo vidi kako je i zbog čega došlo do ove kritične faze. Da ja ne bih prepričavao evo:
Citat:Lessons Learned
Our net assessment of fighter pilot dynamics over the past several decades is that the system has
been out of balance since the post–Cold War drawdown. A fundamental problem is that, when
required sustainment levels exceed absorption capacities and cause production levels to exceed
absorption limits, the health of the operational units is degraded. The resulting imbalances, in
turn, can generate abrupt corrective actions, such as lowering production levels to reduce stress
in these units (see Table D.3). These actions, although essential to prevent stressed or broken
units, tend to drive the fighter aircrew management system even further away from the required
equilibrium among the production, absorption and sustainment elements. This is because lower
production levels inevitably produce lower future inventories, further exacerbating the original
pilot shortfall problems. While preventing broken units may clearly take precedence over
building larger inventories, these issues illustrate system complexities and the consequences of
efforts to operate its elements under sustained saturated5
(or supersaturated) conditions. They
also further illustrate the requirement to bring these elements completely into balance.
Appendix E: Post–Cold War Aircrew Management Decisions
• 1992 cut in new pilot production
− Total production lowered from 1,500 AC pilots per year from FY 1989–1990 to
500 per year from FYs 1994–1996
• 1995–2000 “peace dividend” fighter PMAI cuts (see Figure D.1)
− Cut from 3,170 PMAI in FY 1990 to 1,801 PMAI in FY 1995
− And eventually to 1,617 PMAI by FY 2000
• 1995 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
− Saturated undergraduate pilot training by requiring near-100 percent production
levels
• 1996 Summit
− Set pilot production goals at 1,100 (total) and 370 (fighters)
• 1999 Summit
− Maintained 1,100 total goal, dropped fighters to 330 (with 30 more to be absorbed
in ANG/AFRC units) and set experience objective of 55 percent
§ The 30 AC fighter pilots to be absorbed in ARC units initiative was
conceptually similar to current 8/80 and 4/40 initiatives, but was never
implemented
• 2001 Summit
− Addressed “Pope syndrome” and other stressed or broken units
− Confirmed 1100/330 in active units only
− Reset experience goal to 45 percent minimum to accommodate absorption issues
• 2003 Corona
− Continued to address “Pope syndrome” conditions in other units
− One-time 10 percent “throttle back” in total and fighter production goals
(implemented incrementally over a single Future Year Defense Program)
• 2005 Aircrew Review
− Convened to address continuing overmanning and underexperiencing issues in
ops units
− RAND’s Dynamic Absorption Model indicated that existing policies would stress
or break every absorbing fighter MDS fleet by FY 2010
• 2005 BRAC
− Closed five F-16 squadrons (three at Cannon, one each at Mt. Home and Eielson)
56
§ Prevented these squadrons from absorbing new pilots during transition period
(even though the PAA were eventually redistributed)
§ Raised the manning level for the F-16 wing at Misawa, for example, from a
manageable 105 percent in September 2006 to 126 percent in January 2007,
eventually reaching a distinctly unmanageable 141 percent by May 2007
− Spread IFF to SUPT bases
§ Also disrupted IFF training, slowing production and creating breaks in
training, during the transition period
• 2006 Air Force Smart Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO-21) initiative
− Proposed substituting MTC simulator sessions for flying hours in RAP
requirements and experience definition
− Only F-15Cs had MTCs in 2006; PAF analysis indicated that continuing to pump
new F-15C pilots into operational units at the programmed rates could bring
manning levels down from 125+ percent to 105 percent
§ But would cause a second-tour “choke point,” preventing essential secondtour
pilots from joining the units to fly as IPs and supervisors.
− Initiated 10 percent flying hour cuts to offset MTC costs, to occur across FY
2008–2013 Future Year Defense Program
§ Flying-hour cuts occurred in all fighter MDSs, despite the fact that only
F-15Cs had MTCs at the time
• 2006 Transformational Aircrew Management Initiatives for the 21st Century (TAMI-21)
initiative
− PAF analysis, using its Dynamic Absorption Model, indicated all absorbing
fighter units would be broken if programmed production levels were not reduced
− PAF recommended dropping incrementally to 229 fighter pilots in 2011 and
eventually decreasing to 200 fighter pilots in 2014
− Other recommendations included establishing an RPA career field and using
ANG and AFR units to absorb AC pilots1
− CSAF did not accept recommendations, instead returned to 1100 total and 330
fighter pilot production levels and terminated preliminary experiments for an RPA
career field
• 2007 Four-Star Conference
− Agreed to limit flows of new pilots into saturated units, and gave limited authority
to AF/A3O to manage production between 950 and 1,050 pilots per year
2009 Rated Staff IPT
− Cut fighter requirements by 224 billets, principally by converting staff and test
billets from military to civilian 2
• 2010 CAF Redux3
− Cut 6 percent of F-16 PMAI and 22 percent of F-16 PTAI
− Cut 31 percent of F-15 PMAI and 69 percent of F-15C PTAI
− Cut only ~150 fighter billets, mostly in training and operational units
• 2011 Fighter IPT
− Prepared for Rated Summit 11
• 2011 Rated Summit
− Addressed absorption issues by proposing 8/80 active associate units in ARC
units
− Addressed production constraints by
Removing training sorties from the F-16 FTU syllabus, Increasing throughput
at ANG-managed FTUs (Tucson, Kelly, and Kingsley)
− Set Total Force production goals at 278 (243 AC and 35 RC)
Not currently fully funded
If fully funded and met, would exceed current absorption capacity
Dopuna: 19 Dec 2017 16:02
Osim njihovih grešaka u planovima o školovanju pilota i kolike su im potrebe nadovezale su se i budžetski problemi. Kako se kaže ako se bude potrebnog finansiranja tek negde oko 2027 će se izaći iz ove krize. Očigledno im je potreban još jedan TOP GUN pošto je prijava za pilote porasla za nekoliko desetina procenata posle njega. 
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