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Time 1944

Area of Decision
[Link mogu videti samo ulogovani korisnici]
slika jednog vremena sa autorovim nagibom ugla za 1944

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Mozhesh li malo pojasniti o chemu se radi , jel to ima nekakve veze sa operacijom Halyard i konvencijom u Teheranu ?

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Vazduhoplovac ::Mozhesh li malo pojasniti o chemu se radi
Ocito da ga je uvatila neka prehlada poslednjih meseci pa pise samo u siframa.

@novembarski tango
Nemam nista protiv tvojih stavova. Ponekad nazirem sta zelis reci. Posto je to samo ponekad onda te ovde javno opominjem da pocnes jasnije iznositi svoja misljenja i stavove. Guras nas odmah do zakljucka bez uvoda i razrade. Par tvojih reci...

Smatram da to nije pretezak zahtev. Hvala na razumevanju.

Dopuna: 15 Avg 2009 18:48

"Malo" citiram:

Citat:Mission from Britain. At first the outside world heard chiefly the reverberations of the Tito-Mihailovich clashes. In London and Washington the facts of the Yugoslav resistance were obscured in a game of propaganda hide-and-seek. King Peter's men, through ignorance or fear, or both, would not acknowledge the existence of the Communist leader of the Partisans. They controlled the channels of news coming out of Yugoslavia to the Allied side. For two years the Allied public did not even hear of Tito.

...

Inside Yugoslavia, the growing Parti san movement more & more took matters into its own hands. If King Peter was not interested in the Partisans, for their part they saw little reason to be interested in their absentee monarch. This feeling in creased when the King made Mihailovich a General and Minister of War. Slowly but surely the Partisan movement became also a resistance movement against the old Government.

...

Brigadier Maclean understood the relationship of politics and warfare. He put down what he had observed about Tito in a report that landed, fat, thick, crammed with a story that even yet waits to be published, on the desk of Prime Minister Winston Churchill. That report, and Britain's need for any fighting ally, convinced Downing Street that its warm smile for Peter's exiled Government, and its cold shoulder toward Tito, would have to be reversed.

Churchill acted. A shake-up occurred in the Yugoslav Government in Exile. The new Premier was Dr. Ivan Subasich, a Croat, who was in Manhattan when the summons came. In Bari, on the Italian coast, he sat down with Tito, roughed out a working agreement. The exiled Gov ernment recognized Tito as head of his provisional administration inside Yugo slavia. Tito agreed that at war's end Yugo slavs would get a chance to vote for what ever kind of government they wanted. Meanwhile, the King might continue to call himself King.

...

It had been brought into existence in 1943 at Jajce, with a program that provided for : 1 ) the creation of a federated Yugoslavia composed of the six states of Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia; 2) establishment of "truly democratic" rights and liberties; 3) inviolability of private property; 4) no revolutionary, economic, or social changes.

This was a program that could rally most Yugoslavs. The federated states, 'six small countries with equal rights within one country, could remove the traditional frictions that had divided the Yugoslavs. It was the solution a generation of Yugoslavs had dreamed of. It promised 7 million members of the Greek Orthodox Church, 5 million Roman Catholics, 1,500,000 Mohammedans more, rather than less, freedom. It held out to foreign capital, which Yugoslavia would sorely need when reconstruction came, the promise that Yugoslavia would be one place in the world where a man could turn a profit. This year the blacksmith's boy of Klanjec became Marshal and Provisional President of Yugoslavia.

The new Government, called the National Committee of Liberation, was scarcely more Communist than its program. Out of 17 Cabinet officers, five were Communists. Among the nonCommunists: Foreign Minister Josip Smodlaka, friend of Czechoslovakia's late, great Thomas Masaryk, onetime Yugoslav Minister to the Vatican; the Rev. Vlado Zecevic, Minister of the Interior (and hence in charge of the police). Minister Zecevic was an Orthodox priest who commanded a detachment of Chetniks until late 1941, when he switched from Mihailovich to Tito.