Zašto Treći Rajh nije napao Švedsku i Švajcarsku?

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Zašto Treći Rajh nije napao Švedsku i Švajcarsku?

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  • V. Uzelac
  • Pridružio: 28 Dec 2011
  • Poruke: 664
  • Gde živiš: Bačka Topola

Знам да је постојао план инвазије, операција под именом ''Морски лав''. Само мислим да иако су разрадили план, вероватно су од њега или одустали или у самом старту схватили да неће извршити инвазију на Британију. Ото Скорцени у својим мемоарима наводи разлоге: 1) Требало је држати под контролом огроман број људи у Британији, издвојити трупе за то. 2) Влада и монарх би отишли ван земље и наставили рат одатле.

План инвазије:



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  • ikan 
  • Super građanin
  • Pridružio: 03 Feb 2013
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Ото Скорцени није навео и 3. као главни разлог одустајања од инвазије. А то је морнарица. Нису имали чиме да се превезу и ниси имали морнарицу да заштите мостобране. Како ту ситницу да заборави...



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  • V. Uzelac
  • Pridružio: 28 Dec 2011
  • Poruke: 664
  • Gde živiš: Bačka Topola

Верујем да је и то разлог али сматрам и даље да су и сами одустали од исте због ових првих разлога. Ево, сад размишљам, да су покушали копнену инвазију, заузели део Британије, ту би расули добар део снага што би им касније сигурно фалило на Источном фронту. Друга ствар транспорт тих јединица би био тежак. А опет Британија нема неке веће ресурсе, не знам каква је била екслоатација нафте у Северном мору тад.

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  • Pridružio: 01 Jan 2012
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Hvala Vandrej, to sam i zelio pitati.
Nisam jasno postavio pitanje, a i prilicno je izvan teme, moje izvinjenje.

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  • Pridružio: 06 Mar 2006
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vrlo interesantan tekst o tome zasto je hitler otvorio dva fronta i napao SSSR... niko se ne pita zasto je uradio tako sulud i glup potez neko ko je vec uspeo da porobi evropu- da radi tako stupidnu stvar i ratuje na dva fronta i sebe otera u propast.... napad na SSSR bez resavaja zapadnog fronta je samoubilacki i to bi video svaki vojni redov....
LINK

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  • Pridružio: 06 Mar 2014
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Koji revizionizam! Very Happy
Tekst je na momente kontradiktoran... Autor pokusava da Hesovim "tajnim dogovorom" sa Cercilom iz maja 1941 odbrani tezu da Nemci nisu ratovali sa zapadom 1939 i 1940, u periodu kada je SSSR bio Nemackoj strateski "spoljnotrgovinski partner"?
Amerikanci, tj njihov krupni kapital je najvaznija karika u Hitlerovom brzom usponu. Velike multinacionalne kompanije su nastavile ekonomsku saradnju sa Rajhom do bitke za Britaniju ili cak i posle toga. Osim toga, guranjem ka istoku, Nemacka je ugrozila i vitalnu tacku britanske imperije - Bliski istok i Persiju. Da su to dostigli, Lodnon bi se sam urusio.

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  • Pridružio: 08 Sep 2005
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Uzelac2106 ::Знам да је постојао план инвазије, операција под именом ''Морски лав''. Само мислим да иако су разрадили план, вероватно су од њега или одустали или у самом старту схватили да неће извршити инвазију на Британију. Ото Скорцени у својим мемоарима наводи разлоге: 1) Требало је држати под контролом огроман број људи у Британији, издвојити трупе за то. 2) Влада и монарх би отишли ван земље и наставили рат одатле.

План инвазије:



Iskreno rečeno, ni jedan britanac ne bi opalio metak u "okupatora" - verovatno bi sami britanci dali 300,000 dobrovoljaca u SS...

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  • bojank 
  • Stručni saradnik foruma
  • Pridružio: 31 Dec 2011
  • Poruke: 10599

Hahaha. Revizionizam postoji i sa tvoje strane. I to poprilican.

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  • Pridružio: 06 Mar 2014
  • Poruke: 88

Evo sta kaze Max Hastings u svojoj knjizi "All Hell Let Loose":
Citat:
The Nazis, stunned by the scale of their triumphs, allowed themselves to suffer a loss of momentum. By launching an air assault on Britain, Hitler adopted the worst possible strategic compromise: as master of the Continent, he believed a modest further display of force would suffice to precipitate its surrender. Yet if, instead, he had left Churchill’s people to stew on their island, the prime minister would have faced great difficulties in sustaining national morale and a charade of strategic purpose. A small German contingent dispatched to support the Italian attack on Egypt that autumn would probably have sufficed to expel Britain from the Middle East; Malta could easily have been taken. Such humiliations would have dealt heavy blows to the credibility of Churchill’s policy of fighting on....The prospect of an imminent invasion was less plausible than Britain’s chiefs of staff supposed and Churchill publicly asserted, because the Germans lacked amphibious shipping and escorts to convoy an army across the Channel in the face of an immensely powerful British fleet. Hitler’s heart was never in it. But intelligence about his means and intentions was fragmentary: decryption of enemy cipher traffic at Bletchley Park* lacked anything like the comprehensive coverage achieved later in the war. Much German activity, or absence of it, on the Continent was shrouded from London’s knowledge. British service chiefs, traumatised by the disaster in France, attributed almost mystical powers to the Wehrmacht.... The Luftwaffe’s commanders suffered from a confusion of objectives which persisted throughout the summer. Gen. Albert Kesselring opposed the assault on Britain, preferring instead to seize Gibraltar and gain dominance of the Mediterranean; Hitler initially vetoed bombing of British cities, while Goering rejected attacks on southern ports, which would be needed for the Wehrmacht’s landings... Both air forces wildly overestimated the damage they inflicted on each other, but the Germans’ intelligence failure was more serious, because it sustained their delusion that they were winning. Fighter Command’s stations were targeted by forty Luftwaffe raids during August and early September, yet only two – Manston and Lympne on the Kent coast – were put out of action for more than a few hours, and the radar receivers were largely spared from attention. By late August the Luftwaffe believed Fighter Command’s first-line strength had been halved, to three hundred aircraft. In reality, however, Dowding still deployed around twice that number: attrition was working to the advantage of the British. Between 8 and 23 August, the RAF lost 204 aircraft, but during that month 476 new fighters were built, and many more repaired. The Luftwaffe lost 397, of which 181 were fighters, while only 313 Bf109s and Bf110s were produced by German factories. Fighter Command lost 104 pilots killed in the middle fortnight of August, against 623 Luftwaffe aircrew dead or captured... At the end of August, the Germans made their worst strategic mistake of the campaign: they shifted their objectives from airfields first to London, then to other major cities. Hitler’s air commanders believed this would force Dowding to commit his last reserves, but Britain’s leaders, from Churchill downwards, were vastly relieved. They knew the capital could absorb enormous punishment, while Fighter Command’s installations were vulnerable... The assault remained incoherent: the attackers had begun by seeking to destroy the RAF’s defensive capability, then, before achieving this, switched to attacking morale and industrial targets. Their relatively light bombers carried loads which hurt the British, but lacked sufficient weight to strike fatal blows against a complex modern industrial society...
Brigadier Charles Hudson attended a senior officers’ conference in York in July which was addressed by Anthony Eden as secretary for war. Eden told his audience that he had been instructed by the prime minister to take soundings about the army’s morale. He proposed to ask each general in turn whether, as Hudson recorded, ‘the troops under our command could be counted on to continue the fight in all circumstances … There was almost an audible gasp all round the table.’ Eden intensified the astonishment when he said that ‘a moment might come when the Government would have to make, at short notice, a terrible decision. That point when … it would be definitely unwise to throw in, in a futile attempt to save a hopeless situation, badly armed men against an enemy firmly lodged in England.’ He asked how troops might respond to an order to embark at a northern port for Canada, abandoning their families...
Hitler’s air assault on Britain ranks second only to the invasion of Russia among his great blunders of the war. After June 1940 many of Churchill’s people, especially in high places, recognised their country’s inability to challenge Nazi mastery of the Continent. If they had merely been left to contemplate British impotence, political agitation for a negotiation with Germany might well have been renewed, and gained support from the old appeasers still holding high government office. The unfulfilled threat of air attack, on an annihilatory scale widely anticipated and feared in 1939, could have influenced British policy more strongly than the reality of an inconclusive one.
Posterity sees the period between July 1940 and the spring of 1941 overwhelmingly in terms of Britain’s air battle against the Luftwaffe, yet that engaged only a small proportion of Germany’s military resources... German war industry, still performing relatively sluggishly, needed time to produce tanks, planes and ammunition to replace those expended in the Continental campaigns. The army spent the winter conducting a vast expansion programme – between May 1940 and June 1941 it grew from 5.7 million to 7.3 million men, from 143 divisions to 180.

Hitler spent much less time than the British supposed contemplating the Luftwaffe’s operations against them. He never visited the airfields on the Channel coast. Instead, for most of the autumn and winter he was wrestling with his fundamental strategic dilemma: whether to consolidate Germany’s western victories and invade Britain in 1941, or instead to follow his strongest inclinations and turn east. On 31 July 1940, long before the Luftwaffe attack on Britain reached its climax, at the Berghof he told his generals of his determination to attack Russia the following May. Thereafter, however, he indulged in more months of vacillation. The German navy pressed for major operations to expel Britain from the Mediterranean, by seizing Gibraltar through Spain and the Suez Canal through Libya. In advocating this course, naval C-in-C Admiral Erich Raeder was supported by General Walter Warlimont, head of the Wehrmacht’s strategic planning section. Following an important commanders’ conference in the Reich Chancellery on 4 November, Hitler’s army adjutant Gerhard Engel wrote that the Führer seemed ‘visibly depressed … at the moment he does not know what to do next’.
The western option had still not been finally and formally rejected in November when Molotov, Stalin’s foreign minister, visited Berlin. The Russian displayed an appetite for further Soviet expansionism which roused German ire, expressing Moscow’s interest in the future of Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and even Greece. He enquired whether Sweden’s continuing neutrality suited the common purposes of Germany and the Soviet Union, and was sharply told that it did. His remarks emphasised that if Hitler still had unfulfilled territorial ambitions, so too did Stalin. By the time Molotov boarded a plane home, Hitler was confirmed in his earlier conviction: Germany should attack Russia the following year..
..From his own perspective, he had no choice. The German economy was much less strong than its enemies supposed – only slightly larger than that of Britain, which enjoyed a higher per capita income. It could not indefinitely be sustained on a war footing, and was stretched to the limits to feed the population and arm the Wehrmacht. Hitler was determined to secure his strategic position in Europe before the United States entered the war, which he anticipated in 1942. The only option unavailable to him was that of making peace, since Churchill refused to negotiate. Hitler persuaded himself that British obstinacy was fortified by a belief that Churchill might forge an alliance with Stalin, which could make victory over Germany seem plausible. Thus, the Soviet Union’s defeat would make Britain’s capitulation inevitable. If Germany was destined to engage in a death struggle with Russia, it would be foolish to delay this while Stalin re-armed. On 18 December, Hitler issued a formal directive for an invasion, to be launched at the end of May 1941...
..Hitler saw three reasons for striking: first, he wished to do so, in fulfilment of his ambition to eradicate bolshevism and create a German empire in the east; second, it seemed prudent to eliminate the Soviet threat before again turning west for a final settlement with Britain and the United States; third, he identified economic arguments. Ironically, Russia’s vast deliveries of raw materials and commodities following the Nazi–Soviet Pact – which in 1940 included most of Germany’s animal-feed imports, 74 per cent of its phosphorus, 67 per cent of its asbestos, 65 per cent of chrome ore, 55 per cent of manganese, 40 per cent of nickel and 34 per cent of oil – convinced Hitler that such a level of dependence was intolerable. That summer, a poor German harvest made necessary the import of huge quantities of Ukrainian wheat. He became impatient to appropriate the Soviet Union’s cornbelt, and thirsty for the oil of the Caucasus. Only late in the war did the Allies grasp the severity of their enemies’ fuel problems: petrol was so short that novice Wehrmacht drivers could be given only meagre tuition, resulting in a heavy military vehicle accident rate. Even in 1942, the worst year of the Battle of the Atlantic, Britain imported 10.2 million tons of oil; meanwhile, German imports and synthetic production never exceeded 8.9 million tons. Thus it was that Hitler made seizure of the Caucasian oil wells a key objective of Operation Barbarossa, heedless of the handicap this imposed on operations to destroy the Red Army, by dividing Germany’s forces. He envisaged the invasion of Russia as both an ideological crusade and a campaign of economic conquest. Significantly, he confided nothing of his Russian intentions to the Italians, whose discretion he mistrusted. Throughout the winter of 1940–41, Mussolini continued to nurse happy hopes of a victorious peace following his own conquest of Egypt. It was a striking characteristic of Axis behaviour until 1945 that while there was some limited consultation between Germany, Italy and Japan, there was no attempt to join in creating a coherent common strategy for defeating the Allies.


Inace,on iznosi tezu da Staljinova strategija bila da se Nemci i zapadni saveznici sto vise iscrpe dugim ratom na zapadnom frontu (napad na Francusku i Beneluks), taktika kojom ce mu saveznici kasnije kontrirati.

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  • Pridružio: 03 Apr 2008
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To je bila strategija (ne taktika) svih umesanih strana, ne samo Staljinova.
Svi bi radije ostvarili svoje ciljeve sa sto manje sopstvene krvi i manje razaranja sopstvene zemlje (mada, niko od velikih i nije ocekivao neko razaranje sopstvene zemlje).

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