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Кад смо код књига, занимљиве су аутобиографије, али ја више волим статистику, пружа шири видик...
Књига коју би вредело прочитати је ”Flak - German Anti-aircraft Defenses 1914-1945” - Edward B. Westermann
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Citat:Calculating the Costs of a "Kill"
The economic and matériel costs of maintaining the flak arm are often noted in much of the postwar literature as a justification for implying that the flak arm consumed a great deal of resources while providing a relatively small return. One of the most consistently cited examples of flak inefficiency is the contention that flak gunners expended an average of 16,000 rounds of 88-mm/ Model 36-37 ammunition per aircraft destroyed in 1944. At a cost of 80 RM per round, this equated to 1,280,000 RM, or $512,000, per aircraft destroyed.38 While technically accurate, using the figures for 1944 as a measure of flak effectiveness is equivalent to using share prices from the Dow Jones on October 25, 1929, the day after the infamous crash, as an indicator to track the performance of the stock market for the 1920s. A detailed analysis of the many factors that contributed to the rise in the expenditure of 88-mm ammunition in 1944 demonstrates that the figure of 16,000 rounds of 88-mm ammunition per aircraft shootdown was in many respects a statistical aberration.
The total of 16,000 rounds of 88-mm ammunition per shootdown in 1944 is biased by a number of factors. First, the overwhelming majority of German heavy flak guns in this period were 88mm/Model 36-37.39 These guns had an effective range of up to 26,000 feet, in excess of the B-24's average bombing altitude but near the lower limit of the B-17's normal bombing profile or between 24,000 and 27,000 feet.40 Therefore, the Eighth Air Force's overwhelming use of B-17's over German targets in 1944 meant that the majority of Luftwaffe flak batteries were stretched to, or beyond, the limits of their effective engagement range.41 Second, many batteries were forced to continue using guns that had been effectively degraded by firing beyond their normal operational lives.42 This decreased firing accuracy because of excessive barrel wear and risked the danger of the guns exploding and killing or wounding the gun crews. Throughout 1944, the flak lost 380 88-mm flak guns per month as a result of excessive wear or destruction, a rate of consumption twice that of 1943 and nine times greater than in 1942.43 In addition to the problem of limited ceilings and worn-out barrels, it is important to keep in mind that throughout 1944 there were an average 262 Home Guard heavy flak batteries operating within the Reich.44 These units lacked sophisticated fire control equipment and were equipped only with 88-mm/Model 36-37 guns or modified 75-mm flak guns firing 88-mm ammunition. As a matter of necessity, these units used general barrage fire procedures. The number of the Home Guard batteries, combined with their relatively obsolescent equipment, also helps to explain the high number of rounds еxpended in 1944. Another factor was the Allied employment of improved electronic countermeasures, including the use of a "chaff-screening force," consisting of several bombers equipped with special dispensers, which improved the distribution of chaff and degraded German attempts at radar targeting.41 Finally, the massive influx of auxiliaries into the flak arm in 1943 and 1944, combined with increasingly obsolescent weapons and equipment, degraded the qualitative performance of the 88-mm flak batteries and resulted in rising numbers of rounds per shootdown. Perhaps the most telling example of this last point involves a comparison of the performance of the 128-mm gun with that of the 88-mm/Model 36-37. In the course of 1944, the number of 128-mm rounds per aircraft shootdown was 3,000, less than one-fifth the number expended by its 88-mm counterpart. The large disparity in shootdown per rounds expended between these flak guns was primarily a result of two factors. First, the 128-mm had an effective ceiling of 35,000 feet, well above the operational ceilings of all Allied bombers.46 Second, and most important, regular Luftwaffe flak personnel operated every 128-mm flak gun battery and were considered the "cream" of the Luftwaffe's flak arm.47 The performance of the 128-mm gun crews demonstrates the results that could be obtained with well-trained crews and high-quality equipment.
Unfortunately for the Luftwaffe, by the end of 1944, there were only 31 two-barreled 128-mm guns and a further 525 single-barrel guns, approximately 5 percent of the total number of available heavy flak guns in the flak inventory.48 In contrast to the 1944 estimates of rounds expended per aircraft destroyed, the average number of rounds per shootdown over the course of the first twenty months of the war stood at 2,805 heavy flak rounds and 5,354 light flak rounds.49 During November and December 1943, the flak arm averaged 4,000 rounds of heavy flak ammunition and 6,500 rounds of light flak ammunition per shoot-down in a period in which the flak was battling to overcome the combined effects or Allied jamming efforts and poor weather.50 Over the entire course of the war, one source estimated that the flak arm averaged 4,940 rounds of light flak ammunition and 3,343 rounds of heavy flak ammunition per shoot-down. Using the latter figures, the cost of bringing down an aircraft with heavy flak totaled 267,440 RM, or $106,976, while the cost per aircraft brought down with light flak totaled 37,050 RM, or $14,820.51 Admittedly, using flak munitions expenditures per aircraft destroyed provides only a very rough estimate of the total cost per aircraft shootdown. This estimate omits the value of the resources used in the manufacture of the weapons and their associated equipment, as well as the costs associated with training flak personnel. Likewise, it is difficult to establish a direct comparison between the cost of a fighter kill and a flak kill because there were enormous hidden costs associated with the design, production, and operation of fighter aircraft. In the case of fighters, one must take into account the infrastructure costs associated with the construction and maintenance of airfields, aircraft upkeep and repair, fuel costs, as well as the expenditure involved in pilot training with its specialized training and hundreds of flight hours.
One method by which the cost of an individual flak kill can be placed in perspective involves examining the production costs of some of the aircraft that they were intended to destroy. For example, the cost of a fully outfitted B-17 was approximately $292,000, while a fully equipped B-24 cost approximately $327,000 in 1942.32 In comparison to the heavy bombers, the unit cost of a North American B-25 and Martin B-26 medium bomber in 1942 was $153,396 and $239,655, respectively.33 These unit production costs for the medium bombers do not include expenditures for maintenance, ordnance, and fuel or the costs associated with training the bomber aircrews. In any event, it is apparent that a cost of $107,000 per shootdown for the heavy flak guns and $15,000 per shootdown for the light flak guns was not excessive in comparison with the costs involved in the production of these aircraft. However, the entry into the war of the United States, with its vast economic resources and massive production potential, allowed the Allies in many respects to conduct a war of financial attrition against the Axis powers, a type of
war that the Luftwaffe was ill prepared to wage.
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