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- Pridružio: 17 Sep 2010
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Evo nekih podataka `sa najviseg nivoa` a koji govore o tome da zapravo problema sa finansijama i nije bilo a o raspadu SSSR cu sad na pocetku da raspravim ...
Dakle evo sta pise jedan izvor
Citat:1992: In the State of the Union address on 28 January, U.S. President George Bush proposed further strategic arms reduction to an unspecified limit (reportedly, to 4,700 warheads) under the condition of complete elimination of all MIRVed ICBMs. In the context of such an agreement, he promised to download the number of warheads on Minuteman ICBMs from three to one, to reduce the number of warheads on SLBMs by one-third compared to the START I projected SLBM force, and to convert "a substantial portion" of heavy bombers "to primarily conventional use." He also announced a unilateral decision to terminate the B-2 program at 20 heavy bombers instead of the previously planned 75, cancelled the small ICBM program, ended production of new warheads for SLBMs, and terminated purchases of additional advanced cruise missiles.
 http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-bet.....-start-ii/
Znaci sam Bus je te 1992 g dao naredbu da se broj od 75 aviona umanji na 20 i to po sporazumu START I koji je potpisan godinu ranije a sve u sklopu dogovora kojeg je postigao sa Jelcinjom da ovaj zaustavi dalju proizvodnju Tu-160 .
Citat:The day following President Bush's address, Russian President Yeltsin, in a special televised statement, suggested a warhead limit of 2,000-2,500 warheads, reportedly with the the de-MIRVing of both ICBMs and SLBMs. Yeltsin also declared that Russia had unilaterally terminated the production of its heavy bombers (Tu-160 and Tu-95MS), as well as long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), and proposed renouncing the creation of new types of such missiles on a bilateral basis. He announced that Russia would no longer conduct exercises involving more than 30 heavy bombers, and had reduced by half the number of submarines with SLBMs on patrol. He proposed that Russia and the United States agree on detargeting their nuclear weapons.
Dalje imamo onaj vec poznati dokument iz 1994 u kojem pise da je DoD odobrilo proizvodnju 21 avion a uskladu sa START II ( potpisan jan. 1993) i koje ce omoguciti da se popuna tim brojem aviona izvrsi od dec 1993 ( te 1994 vec je bilo 4 operativna) do 2001 ( 21 avion -16 nukl. nosaca )
Citat:In 1991, the President of the United States took the bombers off nuclear alert status. Subsequently, in January 1993, the Presidents of the UnitedStates and the Russian Federation signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II building on agreements reached in START I signed July 1991. The treaty sets equal ceilings on the number of nuclear weaponsthat can be deployed by either party. If ratified by both countries, the START II treaty would reduce the deployable nuclear warheads to no more than 3,500 by the year 2003. In assessing bomber requirements in light of
the new limits, DOD plans to remove the B-1B from the nuclear role. The B-2s and B-52Hs will retain the nuclear mission.
Znaci moze se uociti da same finansije( u smislu budzetskog odobrenja za ser. proizvodnju ) pa ni raspad SSSR ni bilo sta drugo nisu uticali na donosenje ovih odluka vec striktno pridrzavanje propisa /limita iz START sporazuma .
Za raspad SSSR bi se moglo povezati smanjenje broja aviona sa pocetnih 132 ( iz 1981g ) na onih 75 koje je kasnije Bus licno umanjio na 20 .
Drugo finansije nisu bile problem ,problem je izgleda citav taj period bio tehnicke prirode
Citat:For fiscal years 1996 through 2001, DOD has budgeted about $17 billion to modernize and operate its heavy bomber force.
Neke detalje oko toga nam daje onaj na pocetku pomenuti dokument
Prvo ovo
Citat:Moreover, the 21st B-2 is being procured because the Congress made available an additional $493million in fiscal year 1996 for the B-2 program. Although they may not be needed for the nuclear mission, the carrying capability of these additional aircraft will count toward the START II limits.
Dakle vidimo da je Kongres odobrio dodatnih gotovo pola milijarde dolara za program B-2 sto je opet dokaz da zaista nije bilo finansijskih problema i jos nesto pominje se START II sporazum koji je odredio taj limit tj. broj od 21 avion .
Dalje ...
Citat:To assess the impact of more B-2s on DOD’s nuclear force, we discussed the need for additional B-2s with U.S. Strategic Command officials and obtained their assessment of how additional B-2s would affect compliance with nuclear warhead carrying capability limits included in the START II.In addition, DOD has concluded that additional B-2s are not needed to meet future nuclear war-fighting requirements, particularly in view of the nuclear weapons carrying capability limits included in START II. DOD’s Nuclear Posture Review, completed in 1994, concluded that 66 B-52Hs and 20 B-2 bombers would provide sufficient capability for the nuclear leg of the strategic triad, assuming implementation of START I and II agreementsby 2003. The START II, once implemented, will limit the U.S. nuclear warhead carrying capability to 3,500 warheads, of which about 1,320 are planned for he bomber force. Even with DOD’s planned force of 21 B-2s and 71 B-52Hs, the Air Force will berequired to modify some B-52Hs so that they can carry fewer warheads to stay within the 1,320 limit allocated to the bomber force.
Znaci predlagana je opcija kako bi dodatni B-2 ( u dokumentu se pominje dodatnih 20 aviona sto je total 41 ) uticali na ukupno stanje ABG u START jer je odredjeno 1 B-2 = 1 ABG .Da li bi to onda bilo krsenje dogovora Jelcinj -Bus iz 1992g ?
Citat:Although funding for additional B-2s is not included in DOD’s plan, DOD and the Congress have considered the need to procure additional B-2s inrecent years. DOD has concluded that additional B-2s are not needed tomeet future nuclear war-fighting requirements, particularly in view of the nuclear weapons carrying capability limit included in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II. Also, DOD’s 1995 Heavy Bomber Force Study, which used defense planning assumptions, found that 20 additional B-2s had little effect on the outcome of a conventional conflict and are not needed to
implement the two major regional conflict strategy. Most studies that support buying additional B-2s assume that DOD would have little warning time and limited availability of tactical aircraft to respond to future conventional conflicts. Both assumptions are inconsistent with current defense planning assumptions.Substantial future costs could be avoided if the size of the current B-2 force is capped at 21 aircraft as DOD currently plans. Cost estimates to procure and operate an additional 20 B-2s range from $18.7 billion to $27 billion over 25 years. These additional costs would hinder DOD’s efforts
to develop and implement an affordable long-term recapitalization plan unless offsetting cuts in other programs were realized.
i onda ovo
Citat:The Air Force faces significant technical challenges in completing the 21 B-2s authorized by the Congress, modernizing the B-1B, and demonstrating that they will meet operational requirements.Early test results have identified potential problems in the B-2’s ability to meet some important mission requirements. For example, achieving acceptable radar signatures, the most critical stealth feature needed for B-2 operational effectiveness, has been a problem.
Znaci B-2 je patio vise od tehnickih i eksploatacionih problema nego li od finansijskih .
Za dodatnih 20 je zakljuceno da bi to zaista bilo skupo i da on ima izuzetno velike tehnicke i eksploatacione probleme sto se vise puta pominjalo u raznim drugim dokumentima.
Citat:DOD’s position is that procuring additional B-2s is not cost-effective compared with other alternatives, such as procuring additional precision-guided munitions and upgrading the B-1B.
To je ovaj dokument
http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/155590.pdf
Zakljucak bi nakon svega iznesenog mogao biti da je na ukupno stanje kroz `karijeru` B-2 uticao raspad SSSR ( umanjen broj sa 132 na 75 ) ,finansije ( dodatni kontigent od 20 aviona te njihovo dalje odrzavanje po `cost-effective` odnosu ,rasipanje novca zbog velikih poteskoca u eksploataciji ) , limiti postignuti sporazumima START I i II /21 avion -16 nukl .nosaca / ,veliki tehnicki i eksploatacioni problemi tokom citave karijere ( tokom ispitivanja i oper. upotrebe ).
Moglo bi se reci da B-2 ` hoda kao bos po trnju` ..... ?
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