Virtuelni dogfight

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Virtuelni dogfight

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Kad je reč o pravilima, očigledno ih treba staviti u kontekst, nikako bukvalno intepretirati. Ne znam da li je ovde dat širi kontekst.

Kao što sam već rekao u primeru sa Tajfunom i to smatam da važi za bilo koji moderan lovac i rakete sa aktivnim samonavođenjem i mid course update da su veća opasnost.



Registruj se da bi učestvovao u diskusiji. Registrovanim korisnicima se NE prikazuju reklame unutar poruka.
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@mean

Znamo za to i onda dodamo i ovaj katalog u kojem stoji 50 km za PPS i eto u dva linka dva razlicta podatka i tako to ide redom ...

Citat:
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A u `Vzletu` stoji da je daljina povecana sa 10 na 40 km ,rekoh x- linkova i x- podataka ...



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  • Neimar i savremeni farmer.
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...ај само на кратко да скренем са теме, а реч је о америчком ДАСу. снимак који је окачио меан показује да је праћење лансриња ракете фалкон 9 на неких 800 миља, што би било око 1300км удаљености.

Сад се ја питам да ли је то за јенкије земља равна, па се види на ту даљину, јер на ~1300км удаљености закривљење земље је око 132км, што би значило да је Ф35 морао да лети бар на 132км висине како би лансирање са лица земље виде и пратио. Што би опет повлачило следеће да је оно једно обично просеравање Нортроп Грамана и ништа више...или је пак земља равна па све ово горе не важи...

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sremac983 ::...ај само на кратко да скренем са теме, а реч је о америчком ДАСу. снимак који је окачио меан показује да је праћење лансриња ракете фалкон 9 на неких 800 миља, што би било око 1300км удаљености.

Сад се ја питам да ли је то за јенкије земља равна, па се види на ту даљину, јер на ~1300км удаљености закривљење земље је око 132км, што би значило да је Ф35 морао да лети бар на 132км висине како би лансирање са лица земље виде и пратио. Што би опет повлачило следеће да је оно једно обично просеравање Нортроп Грамана и ништа више...или је пак земља равна па све ово горе не важи...




Wink

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Ljudi stvarno je pomalo otužno koliko niste u stanju postaviti stvari na svoje mesto, kad šta ide i pod kojim uslovima.

F-35 ne savija prostor. Zašto je to predmet diskusije!?!

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  • zixo  Male
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Нешто ми је и даље сумњиво да ОЛС-27 има толике домете, много веће него ОЛС на МиГ-у 29. Smile

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Ne vidim razlog zasto IRST ne bi uhvatio nesto na velikoj daljini tipa 1000km ako se potrefe uslovi i zna se sta se pretrazuje.

Evo malo problematike na moru i da se vide realni uslovi i problemi. Treba naci slicno za avione.

Arrow http://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/15/9/24487/html



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Citat:Missile effectiveness

AIM-7 Sparrow was thoroughly tested by USAF, and in R&D tests it achieved Pk of 80-90%, with operational tests resulting in Pk of 50-60%. In Vietnam, Pk dropped to 8-10%, with many US pilots firing entire AIM-7 loadout, from visual range and from perfect tail position, only to watch all missiles miss.

AIM-9B achieved 15% Pk, which increased to 19% for USN AIM-9D. USAF used AIM-9E and J which scored Pk of around 20% less than B and D models, 12% – 15% Pk. Soviet copy of AIM-9B missile, Atoll, achieved 12% Pk. Radar-guided missiles fared worse. AIM-7D achieved Pk of 8%, which increased to 10% for AIM-7E. AIM-7E2, introduced in last year of the war to correct AIM-7Es fusing problems, achieved Pk of 8%. Despite having long spin-up time, M61 20 mm rotary cannon achieved Pk of 26%.

Out-of-envelope launches only resulted in 7% of non-kills, and 46% of attempts were failures to launch or guide, compared to 30-37% failure rate of AIM-9.

In Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, Pakistani gun- and Sidewinder- -armed F-86s achieved 6:1 exchange ratio against Indian MiG-21s, Sn-7s and Hunters. Subsonic Folland Gnat, smallest fighter in the world, managed to kill several F-86s without suffering losses.

Immediately after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, claims were made than 1/3 of Israeli 251 air-to-air kills were due to Sparrow, and that Sparrow achieved Pk of 50%. As it turned out by 1978, only 12 Sparrows were fired, achieving either none or a single kill, with majority of Israeli pilots refusing to carry Sparrow at all. Only 4 of these firings were made from beyond visual range, and a single kill made might have been from beyond average visual range (5 nm) despite the fact that Israel does not claim it as a BVR kill. As many large fighters are visible well beyond 5 nm (up to 15 nm if engine smokes heavily) it is possible that kill in question was a visual-range one. Out of remaining kills, 2/3 were made with IR missiles and 1/3 with guns, according to statistics avaliable; Israelis however credited 2/3 of their air-to-air kills in both wars to guns or to guns aided by initial missile launch. Syrian pilots hated MiG-23 and considered it a worse fighter than MiG-21. Israeli general Hod stated that in 1973 war radar was “essentially useless” and that only one or no kills were made by radar-guided missiles.

In Bekaa Valley in 1982, 8 kills were with guns, 54 with IR missiles and 12 with radar-guided missiles; more than half of kills were made by “multirole” F-16 despite it being primarly tasked with bombing missions. All radar-guided missile kills except one were from visual range. Total of 5 BVR shots were made, making data range very low. It is known however that Syrian pilots were rather incompetent, with Israel winning 73-0 victory. After the war, Israeli General Mordecai Hod had stated that. had Israelis swapped planes with the enemy, outcome would have been the same.

In Falklands war, British have achieved 19 kills in 26 launches, for a Pk of 73%. Harriers themselves saw little fighting after first day, and almost all kills were against bomb-loaded aircraft. Further, Harriers used only IR missiles, majority of which were fired from rear hemisphere, thus achieving surprise. Argentine pilots did not try to outmaneuver missiles – even when they did notice they were being fired at, they used Vietnam war tactics which did not work with all-aspect missiles used by Harriers. At the same time, all Argentine radar-guided BVR Matra missiles missed.

During entire Cold War, only 3 or 4 air-to-air kills were made from beyond visual range out of 60 – 61 shots made at beyond visual range, for Pk of 5 – 6,6 %. All BVR kills were carefully staged outside combat.

Combat results from 1991 and 2003 invasions of Iraq and 1999 war in Yugoslavia are used to prove that AIM-120 can achieve BVR dominance. Yet these are misleading even if actual statistics are true.

Serbian MiG-29s were suffering from lack of spares since 1996, and resources were spent on riot police instead of maintaining aircraft; their pilots were flying 20 hours annually. To put this into perspective, US pilots even at worst of times flew more than 10 hours per month. Systems on MiG-29s were malfunctioning; on most aircraft, neither radar nor RWR functioned. Despite that, some pilots managed to evade several BVR missiles. One MiG-29 shootdown attributed to AIM-120 could also be a case of Serbian SAM engaging in fratricide; that would make AIM-120 performance as 5 kills in 13 launches, a Pk of 0,38.

As for Iraq, situation was similar with its air force in both wars, with pilots usually failling to take any evasive action once radar lock occured. Thus it is logical that USAF success rate would be similar, and it was. In Desert Storm, 41 USAF aerial victories were achieved with anywhere between 5 and 16 kills made at beyond visual range. 2 kills were made with guns, 10 with IR missiles and 24 with radar-guided missiles. 88 AIM-7 shots were made, giving a Pk of 0,27. Out of 24 AIM-7 kills, at least 9 were from visual range. For F-15Cs, 12 AIM-9 launches resulted in 8 kills (Pk 67%), and 67 AIM-7 launches resulted in 23 kills (Pk 34%). It should be noted that F-16s made 36 AIM-9 launches, of which at least 20 were accidental due to poor control stick ergonomy, and made 0 kills. US Navy F-14s and F-18s fired 21 AIM-7s for one kill (Pk 4,8%), and 38 AIM-9s for two kills (Pk 5,3%). As it can be seen, Pk for missiles fired by multirole F-16s and F-18s (0% and 5%) was far lower than that of missiles fired by singlerole F-15s (67% WVRAAM and 34% BVRAAM), suggesting that pilot training is the primary factor in missile performance. Relative Pk of IR WVRAAM and RF BVRAAM fired by air superiority aircraft stayed same as in Vietnam, with IR WVRAAM Pk twice that of RF BVRAAM.

Between Desert Storm and Allied Force, USAF achieved 3 kills with AIM-9 and 3 with AIM-7, with at least one AIM-7 kills being visual range. Further, on Jaunary 5th 1999, two MiG-25s (equipped with radars for a change, which they used to illuminate US fighters) violated southern “no-fly” zone, and succeeded at evading 3 AIM-7, 1 AIM-120 and 2 AIM-54 missiles, all fired by US fighters from beyond visual range.

These results immediately point to AIM-7s operational tests, when it achieved 50% to 60% Pk against non-maneuvering drone targets.

Problem in using radar-guided BVR missiles against capable opponent is that surprise was always one of dominant factors in air-to-air combat. But radar is an active sensor, and thus warns the opponent of one’s presence.

Further, kills have to be made in as short amount of time as possible. Times for launching and guiding weapon that are longer than 3 and 5 seconds become exponentially more lethal to the pilot, and USN TopGun school teaches (or at least taught) that in one-versus-many and many-versus-many engagements one should never pursue the steady state maneuver or same path for more than 7 seconds.

Time from firing opportunity to breakaway is 3 – 6 seconds for gun, 5 – 7 seconds for IR missile and 10 – 15 seconds for radar-guided missile. Radar-guided missile’s time increases if target is maneuvering or using ECM. Missile’s problems, however, are somewhat reduced by off-bore capability, which means that attacking fighter can maneuver while attempting to gain a lock.

Another problem is suceptibility to countermeasures. Already-fired missiles can be evaded by hard maneuvers, and both gun and missile firing solutions can be defeated by maneuvers. IR missiles’ lock on can be defeated by aircraft flying out of seeker’s field of view, whereas with radar guided missiles, it is possible to avoid or break radar lock (“beam turn” and “doppler turn”), as well as prevent or delay radar lock with jamming. For most of these counters, target must be aware that it is being targeted, which makes fully-passive IR missiles inherently superior to radar-guided ones.

But even greater problem than missiles’ relative ineffectiveness is its impact on user’s skill and on number of aircraft that can be put into the air. Aircraft that rely on BVR combat are more complex than dogfighters, which makes them more expensive for same weight as well as less reliable. Fighters with BVR focus are also larger and heavier than WVR fighters, which results in even higher cost and worse dogfighting performance. BVR-centric F-4E cost 3 times as much per flight hour as F-5E, and F-15 costs 4 times as much per flight hour as F-16. Stealth fighters are even worse: F-22 costs 12 times as much per flight hour as JAS-39.

Gun effectiveness

During Six Day war all shootdowns achieved by Israeli were by cannon. It dropped to 70% during Attrition War, 30% during Yom Kippur war, and 7% in Lebanon Interdiction in 1972. During 1982, only 4 shootdowns scored by British fighters were by gun, and US only scored 2 during Desert Storm.

But one should not assume that gun is outdated. During Vietnam war, cannon-armed aircraft performed far better than missile-only aircraft. Of F-105Ds 27,5 kills, only 2 were by missile. Cannon-armed F-8 achieved best kills:loss ratio of all US aircraft in Vietnam, 6:1 as opposed to average score that was 2,15:1 for USAF and 2,75:1 for USN.

In total, F-100 achieved 1 victory with cannon; F-105 achieved 31 victory, of which 3 were by AIM-9 and 28 by cannon. F-4 achieved 156 victories, of which 67 with AIM-7, 70 with AIM-9 and 17 with cannon. F-8 achieved 19 victories, of which 14 were by AIM-9 and 5 with cannon. A-7 achieved 1 victory with cannon. Total is 52 victories with cannon, 87 with AIM-9 and 67 with AIM-7.

In air combat, length of burst is rarely greater than 1 or 1,5 seconds as longer bursts have no application, with standard being 0,5 s. Gattling guns require 0,3 to 0,6 seconds to achieve full rate of fire, while revolver cannons require 0,05 seconds to achieve full rate of fire. Result is that in 0,5 second burst, GIAT-30 achieves 8 MJ of energy, M61A2 ~4,3 MJ, M61A1 ~3,6 MJ, BK-27 ~4,9 MJ, and GAU-12U just above 6 MJ. Combination of heavy and destructive shell, relatively high rate of fire and high muzzle velocity makes GIAT-30 best fighter cannon in the world. Revolver cannons in general are more suited for ACM application than rotary cannons because of ACM requirement of using short bursts while maintaining high rate of fire.


https://defenseissues.net/2013/06/15/air-to-air-weapons-effectiveness/

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MiG-29 versus Mirage 2000: personal account from Air Marshal Harish Masand
Citat:
I only remember that the ’29 outperformed the Mirage in every sphere from sustained rate of turn to climb and even in instantaneous rate of turn. This was as our side had expected, having earlier theoretically compared the performance figures for the two aircraft. The only doubt in our minds was about the performance of the fly-by-wire system which could reportedly produce the optimum performance on the Mirage in any given set of conditions, albeit with an over-ride for the slightly enhanced performance for a short duration while we had to get the best out of the MiG-29 manually through conventional hydraulic controls. Due to this reason, I would have been quite content to see the initial instantaneous rate of turn on the Mirage to be better, at least for the first 90 to 180 degrees of the turn, till the induced drag of the delta platform and the lower thrust to weight ratio of the Mirage took over. However, I had been working on coordinated pressures on the control surfaces to generate even rapid manoeuvres, instead of large or even noticeable movements on the controls which had their own problems, particularly at low-levels, for my displays on the 29 since Aug-Sep 1987 and, was very pleasantly surprised to see that this effort really paid off and even the instantaneous rate of turn was in our FAVOUR..

In a turn towards the Mirage, I found we were crossing even 90 degrees before the Mirage. Also, I had noticed, while practicing for the displays, that the 29 accelerated even at 9g at low-levels if the power was ahead of the onset of g and, therefore, required a coordinated turn with power management to stay at the optimum speed and at the desired g.

As a matter of fact, I used to brief and show my younger pilots that if you went up faster on the throttle than the onset of g, the aircraft would be on the higher side of the curve and would keep accelerating even at 9g. In that case, the options were only two, either reduce the power to get the speed back or pull more than 9g, the latter option being beyond the laid-down limits for the aircraft. The corollary was that, at the correct speed and with the correct technique, the 29 would keep turning at 9g at low-levels till either you conked off or till the gas ran out. I mean the gas had to run out either in you or the aircraft if you wanted to foolishly continue with such a manoeuvre for a prolonged duration. Such was the brute power of the two engines on the 29 and the thrust-weight ratio. Naturally, our rate of climb was also better. While range fuel consumptions were better for the Mirage due to the shape and the resultant profile drag apart from the weight and the single engine configuration, in combat situations, we ended up consuming almost the same fuel due to the fact that the 29 did not have to remain in the afterburner regime through out the engagement.

Pudding was naturally upset with this outcome and convinced Jeff to repeat the sortie. Jeff agreed since a couple of other parameters, particularly in initial and sustained rate of climb, had to be rechecked in any case. So next day in the green period, there we were, Pudding and I, with Vicky and Joe in the rear cockpits I think, to haul the aircraft around again and measure the figures. Quite naturally, the results were the same as before. During debrief, Pudding first started off with the proposition that we were not comparing pilots but aircraft and, therefore, instead of me, somebody else should fly the 29. While I was quite happy to let even the youngest and most inexperienced pilot fly in other tactical exercises, such 9g manoeuvring and handling the aircraft to its limits at low-levels was something that one could not leave to a lesser qualified and less experienced pilot.

I, therefore, opposed the suggestion and Jeff agreed with my view. In a lighter vein, I also made a counter-suggestion that, instead of Pudding, someone 40 Kg lighter fly the Mirage which might improve its thrust-weight ratio and thus its performance. I am sure if Pudding had been wearing slippers at that time, I would have got them immediately but since he could not easily bend down and undo his flying boots, I got away with just glares. If only looks could kill. I also remarked that the Mirage could be flown by anybody since you merely demanded the best performance from the smart fly-by-wire system. Unfortunately, with a ‘dumb’ flying control system in the 29, we needed rather smart pilots to fly it to its limits. Pudding let me off again, having known each other quite well since the early years of our flying in Hasimara/Bagdogra. Finally, it was decided by Jeff that we would do yet another trip for the instantaneous rate of turn, to be measured only through 90 degrees of turn. While we were leaving the briefing room, Joe just whispered “Dirty Harry getting dirty looks, Keep checking 6”. As may be obvious from the foregoing, we were ahead even within 90 degrees while sustaining our speeds

Later, we got into group combat and specific missions to try out the aircraft in their designated roles, where even the most inexperienced of our lot were given the opportunity to participate, some with less than 50 hours on type. From the tales I heard in and outside the briefing room, I know they all had a lot of fun while learning DACT with a capable and experienced adversary. While I do not wish to go into individual skills and claims in this area, it may not be difficult to guess these, being typical of die-hard fighter jocks. Suffice it to say that, in these exercises, our radar, IRST, HMSD and the voice information system really proved their worth and were put to good use.



https://hushkit.net/2019/08/12/mig-29-versus-mirag.....sh-masand/

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  • vampire and philosopher, po©smt, rhd©t
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Вероватно нисам баш најсрећније одабрао тему, али прво ми је она пала на памет:Citat:Top 12 coolest air forces

...

8. Serbian Air Force and Air Defence (Ратно ваздухопловство и противваздухопловна одбрана Војске Србије)

Anything with Soviet era-jets is going to rank highly on this list – we can all agree that anything from the East stomps all over trashy American garbage in the hotness factor. But what about rare, exotic, Communist-but-not-actually-Soviet indigenous designs?

Enter Serbia. If you like elusive, unheard of types, this is the country to hit up, with the Serbian Air Force still operating and soldiering on with no less than three native types. The two trainers, the Lasta 95 and G-4 Super Galeb (even better than the regular Galeb) are fairly bog standard, but you won’t see them anywhere else (except, weirdly, Iraq and Myanmar respectively – bizarre export destinations? Count me in) which gives them a real edge in the non-combat arena.

But the créme-de-la-créme, the real jewel in the Balkan crown, is the J-22 Orao, possibly the rarest and more obscure combat jet in the world (Taiwan’s FUCK-1 fighter losing out due to having an hilarious and memorable name). Produced only in Yugoslavia and Romania, but now only operated by Serbia, the Jaguarovic oozes second-world charisma and charm. Still (zabranjeno)ing on in service, this is a jet that uses afterburning Rolls-Royce Vipers and minimal avionics upgrades that can operate off grass runways. I think I’m in love!

Serbia also flies the Gazelle, licence-built back in the day, bringing some wonderful French flair to their eastern-flavoured inventory. The whistling turkey-leg might not be the most obscure type, but it’s never been anything less than full of character. It’s a properly varied air force, and if you’re into rare type it’s the dream – and for a small nation like Serbia it’s all the more awesome to keep flying these aircraft...
https://hushkit.net/2019/08/15/top-10-coolest-air-forces/

Јагуаровић... Mr. Green

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