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Citat: The research carried out by Yugoslav scientists with their Norwegian counterparts appears to have been consistent with a nuclear weapons program. In addition to plutonium reprocessing, investigations were carried out into uranium enrichment using the electromagnetic isotope separation techniques, employing Vinca's calutron and Rudjer Boskovic's cyclotron, as well as other enrichment methods at Vinca.[7] According to a Norwegian correspondent, in 1953 Yugoslav scientists working at Kjeller may have also smuggled a quantity of highly enriched uranium back to Vinca.[8] Tito's decision in the late 1940s to develop a nuclear weapon, evident in the founding of the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences, appears to have coincided with Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet Union. In September 1949, Stevan Dedijer, a former director of the Vinca Institute, was recruited to the weapons program and was told by one of Tito's closest collaborators, Edvard Kardelj: "We must have the atomic bomb."[9] In 1955, the Federal Commission for Nuclear Energy (FCNE) was established to supervise the development of the nuclear program. Aleksandr Rankovic, head of the secret police, became the head of the Commission.[10]
Security considerations were probably a factor in Tito's initial decision to pursue a nuclear weapons capability. Having learned of the Soviet atomic bomb and fearing Stalin's retribution following the split between the two countries, Tito might have thought that a nuclear deterrent would discourage a Soviet invasion. Security, however, was not the sole reason, and, as some analysts argue, not the most important one.[11] Considering Yugoslavia's position at the time, the desire for international status might have been the decisive factor. Yugoslavia collaborated with Norway in the field of plutonium reprocessing, established a spent fuel reprocessing department at Vinca, signed a cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union in 1956 for the 6.5 MW heavy water moderated and cooled RA research reactor, and constructed the RB, a zero power heavy water natural uranium critical assembly. The RA reactor, described by Vinca officials as "essentially a plutonium production reactor," was fundamental in Tito's weapons research.[12]
In the early 1960s, as the nuclear research program was gaining momentum, Tito reportedly de-emphasized the weapons aspect of the program. In 1958, a criticality accident at Vinca's heavy water RB reactor killed one person and left five more with radiation poisoning. However, Tito's decision may have been based on the thaw felt in Soviet-Yugoslav relations following Stalin's death. Other factors may have included the apparent lack of results of the program and the financial strains it was putting on the country's economy. Additionally, Yugoslavia's international position was to advocate for nuclear disarmament and to press the nuclear weapon states to dispense with their nuclear arms.[13] Yugoslavia signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified it in 1970. There were also signs that the focus of Yugoslavia's nuclear program was shifting from a research to a nuclear power program. After years of feasibility studies, the U.S. firm Westinghouse was selected to build the country's first nuclear power plant, a 664MW[14] pressurized light water reactor at Krsko.[15]
Yugoslavia's decision to abandon nuclear weapons development was reversed on 18 May 1974 after India, Yugoslavia's long-time rival for the NAM leadership, carried out its first nuclear test. According to first-hand accounts, immediately after the Indian test Tito called two meetings with the heads of the country's primary nuclear research facilities, representatives of the armed services, and military intelligence officials. During the meetings, military representatives instructed those present to develop ways to utilize the civilian power program as a cover for a parallel weapons program.[16]
During the 1970s, Yugoslavia became increasingly frustrated with the apparent monopoly by the major nuclear powers of nuclear technology. Yugoslav government officials began demanding easier access to nuclear technology, claiming that the "gigantic world cartel of nuclear powers" refused to share their nuclear know-how with the developing world.[17] Yugoslavia began implicitly tying the slow pace of nuclear transfers to its security concerns, stating: "It depends the least upon us whether Yugoslavia will be obliged to consider her A-bomb or even to begin her production."[18] Perhaps feeling as if the taboo surrounding nuclear weapons was lifted by the nuclear powers' failure to take steps toward nuclear disarmament, the government announced, through the newspaper Borba, the possibility of building a nuclear weapon: "...[S]hould the use of mass terror be contemplated, or should nuclear or other weapons for mass destruction be used, our country may, in the framework of the general defence concept, reconsider its attitude towards the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons."[19]
After Tito's death in 1980, Yugoslavia continued its nuclear weapons development, led by the new secretary of defense, Admiral Branko Mamula, who was an active supporter of the weapons program. Under Admiral Mamula, scientists worked on two parallel programs that were linked in infrastructure and funding. Program A was designed to develop nuclear weapons, while Program B focused on Yugoslavia's nuclear power program and concealing Program A.[20] The Military Technical Institute (MTI) oversaw operations for both programs. Most of Yugoslavia's nuclear research facilities were involved in one way or another with either Program A or Program B; however, the majority of the weapons research was undertaken by scientists at Vinca, the University of Belgrade's Institute of Physics, and at MTI facilities.[21]
On 7 July 1987, during a meeting at MTI, it was announced that Program A would be terminated.[22] Several reasons influenced Yugoslavia's decision yet again to abandon the weapons drive. These factors included the declining importance of nuclear power to Yugoslavia's economic growth, its waning desire for international prestige, and the nuclear program's heavy financial burden. As a result of these factors, the leadership and scientists lost enthusiasm for the program.[23]
Soon after Program A ended, Program B met the same fate.
http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/former-yugoslavia/nuclear/
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