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Један од ретких митова комунистичког доба који је опстао до данашњег дана се односи на догађаје који су се десили на овим просторима пре 70 година.
Теза је проста и наизглед врло логична - ”Због пуча 27. марта и Априлског рата, немци су морали да одложе напад на СССР за 5 недеља. Због тога немци нису стигли до зиме до Москве, чиме је вероватно и спашен СССР.”, или у мало романсираној форми - ”27. март је жртвовао Југославију, али је спасао СССР.”
У овој теми ћемо анализирати тадашњу ситуацију, како бисмо утврдили колико има истине у овом миту.
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Ситуација у Европи марта 1941.
Марта 1941. године Нацистичка Немачка доминирала Европом.
Аустрија, Чехословачка, Пољска, Француска, Норвешка су биле окупиране. Шпанија, Виши Француска, Шведска и Турска су биле неутралне, али са добрим везама према Немачкој.
Немачки ваздушни напад на Британију је пропао, и било је јасно да инвазија није могућа у скоријем периоду.
Са друге стране, СССР је успео да поврати део територија које је Русија изгубила у грађанском рату - осим Финске која се одбранила у Зимском рату.
Земље на Југоистоку Европе су биле у Хитлеровом центру пажње, и оне су приступиле Тројном пакту - Мађарска, Румунија, Бугарска и накратко Југославија.
Грчка се једина борила против неуспешне Италијанске инвазије.
Осим Европе, борбе су се водиле и у Средоземљу.
Силе осовине су пресекле британски пут снабдевања кроз Средоземље, али су британци добијали потребне залихе преко Суецког канала. Слаба логистика је спречавала јачање немачких снага у Северној Африци и заузимање целог Средоземља. Било је потребно да се изврше обимне припреме за наставак операција.
Планови напада Немачке за 1941.
Пошто је увидео да без обимних припрема није могуће поразити Велику Британију, Хитлер је 18. децембра 1940. године донео одлуку о припремама за напад на СССР, директиву 21.
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Führer_Directive_21
Citat:Directive Nr. 21
Case Barbarossa
The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England (Case Barbarossa).
For this purpose the Army will have to employ all available units with the reservation that the occupied territories will have to be safeguarded against surprise attacks.
For the Eastern campaign the Airforce will have to free such strong forces for the support of the Army that a quick completion of the ground operations may be expected and that damage of the eastern German territories will be avoided as much as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the east is limited by the following reservation: That the entire battle and armament area dominated by us must remain sufficiently protected against enemy air attacks and that the attacks on England and especially the supply for them must not be permitted to break down.
Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains unequivocally against England also during an Eastern Campaign.
If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops for action against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended beginning of operations.
Preparations requiring more time to start are—if this has not yet been done—to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 May 1941.
Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized.
The preparations of the High Command are to be made on the following basis:
I. General Purpose
The mass of the Russian Army in Western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations by driving forward deep wedges with tanks and the retreat of intact battle-ready troops into the wide spaces of Russia is to be prevented.
In quick pursuit a (given) line is to be reached from where the Russian Airforce will no longer be able to attack German Reich territory. The first goal of operations is the protection from Asiatic Russia from the general line Volga-Archangelsk. In case of necessity, the last industrial area in the Urals left to Russia could be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.
In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet will quickly erase its bases and will no longer be ready to fight.
Effective intervention by the Russian Airforce is to be prevented through forceful blows at the beginning of the operations.
II. Probable Allies and their tasks
1. [Introduction about possible control of Rumania and Finland by Germany omitted]
2. It will be the task of Rumania, together with the forces concentrating there, to pin down the opponent on the other side and, in addition, to render auxiliary services in the rear area.
3. [Finland's objective omitted]
4. [Possible role of Sweden omitted]
III. [Conduct of the Operations omitted]
IV
It must be clearly understood that all orders to be given by the commanders-in-chief on the basis of this letter of instructions are precautionary measures, in case Russia should change her present attitude toward us. The number of officers to be drafted for the preparations at an early time is to be kept as small as possible. Further co-workers are to be detailed as late as possible and only as far as each individual is needed for a specific task. Otherwise, the danger exists that our preparations (the time of their execution has not fixed) will become known and thereby grave political and military disadvantages would result.
V
I am expecting the reports of the commanders-in-chief on their further plans based on this letter of instructions.
The preparation planned by all branches of the Armed Forces are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in regard to their time.
На основу овога се види да је Хитлеру било јасно да Велику Британију није могуће победити без дуготрајних припрема, те да је мислио да ће СССР победити брзо.
Што се тиче датума почетка напада, имамо следеће реченице из Директиве 21:
Citat:If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops for action against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended beginning of operations.
Preparations requiring more time to start are—if this has not yet been done—to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 May 1941.
Сам датум напада није најјасније дат - што је логично узевши у обзир да није било могуће испланирати све прилике.
Оно што се може закључити из овога, јесте да је задњи рок за напад био 10. јул (осам недеља после 15. маја). Напад је требао да буде најављен 8 недеља пре почетка.
Такође, из овога се види како се у миту дошло до процене одгађања од 5 недеља - 22. јун кад је нападнут СССР, је 5 недеља и 3 дана после 15. маја. Овде већ видимо да мит греши - 15. мај није био прецизиран као датум почетка напада.
Други проблем у овом миту је што је напад на СССР требао бити најављен 8 недеља раније. Одлука о нападу на Југославију је донесена одмах после пуча од 27. марта - мање од 7 недеља пре 15. маја, што је значило да је већ тада Хитлер знао да напад неће бити почет у мају.
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Пар занимљивих текстова из страних извора:
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/balkan/20_260_5.htm
Citat:By its intervention in the Balkans in 1940-41 Britain actually opened a second front several months before the first front—in Russia—had come into being. That this strategic move was largely abortive and had little immediate effect on the execution of Operation BARBAROSSA seems only incidental. The Axis Powers enlarged their area of responsibility by occupying territories whose economic potential was of some importance, but whose strategic advantages they were unable to exploit. Resenting occupation by Italian forces, Greek and Yugoslav nationalists were soon to rise against their conquerors. From that time through the end of World War II, the Balkan sore in the Axis flank refused to heal.
Actually, Germany had little choice in the matter of launching the campaigns in the Balkans. Once Mussolini had committed the blunder of thrusting his blunt sword across the Albanian border into Greece and had suffered bitter reverses, Hitler felt obliged to rescue his brother-in-arms. Aside from reasons of prestige, Hitler's hand was forced by the British occupation of Crete and other Greek islands as well as by subsequent Russian and British political activities in the Balkans. The threat to Germany's southern flank in the impending invasion of Russia could either be eliminated by a lightning offensive or neutralized by creating a defensive belt of security in the Balkans. The former solution, which Hitler decided to adopt, had the advantage that only relatively small forces were tied down. Had the Germans adopted defensive methods, they would probably have had to commit more forces in the Balkans in the long run. A minimum force of three divisions would inevitably have been needed in Albania to support the Italians. Sooner or later the British would have succeeded in drawing Yugoslavia into the war on their side. If this had happened while Germany was engaged in hostilities with the USSR, an extremely dangerous situation might have developed.
Assuming therefore that the Germans were forced to execute the Balkan campaigns before they invaded Russia, the next step is to analyze the connection between these military operations.
Chapter 24 Influence of the Plans for Operation BARBAROSSA on the Campaigns in the Balkans
I. Hasty Execution of the Balkan Campaigns
In order to avoid any unnecessary delay in launching Operation BARBABOSSA, the two campaigns in the Balkans and the seizure of Crete had to be carried out with utmost speed. In many instances during the Yugoslav campaign divisions could not be fully assembled, and advance echelons had to jump off while the rear elements were still on the move to the concentration areas. The haste with which Crete had to be seized led to a number of improvisations in the preparation and execution of this airborne operation. Many of the deficiencies could have been avoided, had the Germans not been so pressed for time.
II. Hurried Redeployment from the Balkans
Even before the German victories in Yugoslavia and Greece had been fully achieved, some of the units had to be redeployed to Germany to be refitted in time for Operation BARBAROSSA. Some of the corps headquarters, GHQ units, and, above all, the mechanized divisions committed in the Yugoslav campaign were indispensable for the start of the invasion of Russia. In some instances units were stopped in mid-action and redeployed to the zone of interior. Because of the poor roads and defective railways in the Balkans, these movements interfered with the smooth execution of the military operations.
III. Defective Occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece
The insistence on speedy redeployment made it impossible to completely disarm the enemy forces or comb out the mountain areas in which some of the stragglers found refuge. Many weapons were hidden and stocks of military supplies vanished before they could be seized. The early rise of resistance and partisan movements in the Balkans was facilitated by the haste with which military operations in this theater had to be brought to an end.
Chapter 25 Effect of the Balkan Campaigns on Operation BARBAROSSA
I. Delay of Operation BARBAROSSA
Because of the annual spring floods in eastern Poland and western European Russia, 15 May was the earliest possible date for the start of the invasion of Russia. No postponement was mentioned before the Yugoslav revolt, which had an immediate effect on the plans for Operation BARBAROSSA. As early as 27 March Hitler estimated that the campaign against Yugoslavia would delay the invasion by about four weeks. This estimate was based on the diversion of forces for the assembly against Yugoslavia. Headquarters staffs, divisions, and GHQ units that were on the way to the concentration areas for Operation BARBAROSSA or whose departure was imminent had to be diverted. Those units had to be replaced by others whose departure was delayed because they were not ready for commitment. However, of the two corps headquarters and nine divisions that were diverted to the Yugoslav campaign, all but three infantry divisions were replaced from the Army High Command reserves by the time Operation BARBAROSSA got under way.
Another factor considered in calculating the delay was that all. units, in particular the armored and motorized infantry divisions, would have to be refitted after the Balkan campaigns. This rehabilitation, which was estimated to take a minimum of three weeks for the mobile Units, had to be performed within Germany in the vicinity of major repair shops and spare parts depots.
The plans for the invasion of Russia were modified in accordance with this estimate. On 7 April Field Marshal von Brauchitsch issued an order in which he explained that Operation 25 necessitated changes in the preparations for the Russian campaign postponing it between four and six weeks. The new target date was to be 22 June. Subsequent conferences between Hitler and his military advisers confirmed this new date for D-day, and it was adhered to in the end.
Actually, only part of the delay was caused by the campaigns in the Balkans. Operation BARBAROSSA could not possibly have started on 15 May because spring came late in 1941. As late as the beginning of June the Polish-Russian river valleys were still flooded and partly impassable as a result of exceptionally heavy rains
II. The Redeployment of the Ground Forces
As soon as it became apparent that the Yugoslav campaign would be over within a relatively short time, the movement of forces destined for the Balkans was stopped and reversed. As early as 14 April three corps and seven divisions were rerouted to their respective points of departure in Germany and Romania. The redeployment of mobile divisions employed in Yugoslavia started on 21 April when the 16th Motorized Infantry Division w as ordered to reassemble before entraining for Germany. Two days later three of the panzer divisions received similar orders.
While the campaigns in the Balkans were under way, the German Army hurriedly organized weak security divisions that were to be sent to western Europe and the Balkans for occupation duty. By the end of May five of these divisions had arrived in Yugoslavia and taken the place of all the combat divisions still remaining in that country. All but three of the German divisions employed in the Greek and (Crete campaigns were redeployed before the beginning of Operation BARBAROSSA. Only the 2d and 5th Panzer Divisions, which had advanced as far as southern Greece, were not available in time for the start of the invasion.
III. The Influence on Air Operations
The considerable losses suffered by the Luftwaffe during the seizure of Crete, especially insofar as troop carrier planes were concerned, affected the strength of the German air power available at the start of the Russian campaign. Moreover, since the German parachute troops had been decimated in Crete, the number of men qualified to carry out huge-scale airborne operations at the beginning of the invasion was insufficient.
As previously mentioned, the timetable for the attack on Russia did not allow for exploiting the strategic advantages the Germans had gained in the eastern Mediterranean. Even before the seizure of Crete had been accomplished, VIII Air Corps was ordered to redeploy its forces to Germany for refitting. While the ground personnel proceeded directly to their new bases in Poland, the flying units returned to Germany as soon as they could be released from participation in the Crete campaign. The movement along extended and complicated lines of communication had to be accomplished with maximum speed since it had to be completed in less than three weeks.
IV. The Balkan Campaigns as a Diversion
The German operations in the eastern Mediterranean in the spring of 1~)41 were successful in diverting world attention from the build-up in Poland. Coinciding with Rommel's advance in the North African desert, the German campaigns in the Balkans seemed to indicate that Hitler s plans of expansion were directed toward the eastern Mediterranean. The airborne of Crete seemed to confirm the opinion that Hitler was bells on taking Suez by a combined air, sea, and ground operation. While the Russians were far from pleased to see the Balkans under German domination, they must have followed the diversion of German strength with Ore it interest. The complete surprise achieved by the German invasion of Russia on 22 June may be partly attributed to the fact that the Balkan operations drew attention from the preparations that took place in Poland during April and May 1941.
Chapter 26 Conclusions
To form an unbiased opinion of the true relationship between the campaigns in the Balkans and the invasion of Russia is far from easy. German military authors state that the diversion in the Balkans had hardly any influence on the course of the subsequent campaign, since Germany's casualties were relatively low and the expenditure of materiel and supplies insignificant. They agree that the invasion of Russia might have started three weeks earlier if there had been no Balkan campaigns. This delay of three weeks might appear of decisive importance considering that the sudden start of severe winter weather turned the tide when the Germans stood in front of Moscow. To them the validity of this theory seems at least doubtful considering the fact that the German offensive in Russia in 1941 collapsed because of the conflict over the strategic concepts that broke out between Hitler and the Army High Command in the summer of that year. That controversy over the strategy to be adopted after the initial successes had been achieved cost the German Army several precious weeks. Additional time and a lot of manpower were wasted by Hitler's insistence on making Leningrad and the Ukraine his principal objectives until he finally Greed to a drive on Moscow before the outbreak of winter. The three creeks lost by the execution of the Balkan operations therefore seem of minor significance.
On the other hand, postwar publications by authors of other nationalities stress that the British intervention in Greece and Crete, and even more the Yugoslav revolt, led to the postponement of Operation BARBAROSSA to 22 June, while they de-emphasize the effect of the spring floods.
In the light of the gigantic struggle that was to begin a few weeks after their conclusion, the campaigns in the Balkans may be considered as the Wehrmacht's last blitz victories before the Germans met their fate in Russia.
Још један занимљив текст који обрће ситуацију:
Citat:"The invasion was originally scheduled to be ready for 15 May, although that was not settled upon as the date of attack. Once Halder had assured him that transport would be ready, Hitler chose 22 June for the attack, since any date much earlier than that would have run up against weather problems in that unusually wet spring. The invasion of Greece had always been planned to take place in conjunction with that of Russia and did not therefore lead to the postponement of Barbarossa. Re-equipping tanks that had driven too fast down bad Balkan roads took time, so in a sense the very speed of the defeat of Greece led to the late date for Barbarossa.
Although Hitler was to blame the pushing back of the 15 May date to 22 June as a reason for his defeat, claiming that he could have won before the onset of winter, his biographer Ian Kershaw has rightly described that as 'simplistic in the extreme'. It was too wet to invade very much earlier, with heavy tanks and trucks going down rutted, basic roads. The weather of 1941 was not kind to Adolf Hitler.It is often assumed that he should not have indulged in his Balkan, Greek & Crete campaigns in April and May because they delayed his assault on Russia. In fact it was because he could not invade Russia before June that he was able to indulge himself in south-west Europe and the Mediterranean at all."
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Стратешки положај Југославије и Грчке
Остаје велико питање колико су Југославија и Грчка биле озбиљне претње Немачкој, да их они нису поразили у Априлском рату.
Јасно је да су Југословенска и Грчка војска биле застареле, те да се нису могле одупрети савременој и искусној немачкој војсци. Једини начин да се одржи положај је био уз помоћ Британаца преко Медитерана.
Србија и Грчка су се у Првом светском рату снабдевале том рутом, али се отад пуно променило - Француска је била избачена из рата, Италија на супарничкој страни, а линија снабдевања кроз Медитеран практично затворена.
То би значило да би све залихе за то војиште морале да иду из Британије око Африке, кроз Суецки канал, ка Грчкој, где би бродови били изложени нападу на поласку и доласку. Залихе би путовале месецима, и то у време кад је Британска позиција у Средоземљу угрожена.
Ситуација би била још тежа за Србију, јер би од Солуна снабдевање ишло једнотрачном железницом. Линија снабдевања и одступница су биле угрожене нападима из Бугарске.
Отварање другог фронта на Балкану је било логистички огроман проблем, те зато Британци нису ни кренули тим правцем - док Немци нису кренули да се повлаче крајем 1944.
То све иде у прилог да Балкан није био стратешки важан да би се одгодила инвазија СССР, већ да је било могуће напасти Балкан пре напада на СССР.
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Метеоролошке прилике пред операцију Барбароса
На одлуку о почетку операције Барбароса су у великој мери утицале метеоролошке прилике. Комуникације у СССР-у су биле прилично лоше. Железничка мрежа је била развијенија на западу, да би ка истоку земље била све лошија. Проблем за нападача је другачија ширина колосека, која се морала променити, као и другачија железничка инфраструктура.
Путеви су били прилично лоши, често од набијене земље, тако да су у периоду киша, у пролеће и јесен, били слабо проходни (тај период се на руском зове распутица, превод није потребан). Сваки напад у том периоду би се врло брзо заглавио, због чега се тај период традиционално избегавао за ратна дејства.
Погледајмо датуме неких великих офанзива:
- 1812. Наполеонова инвазија Русија - 28. јун
- 1915. Горлице-Тарнов офанзива - 1. мај
- 1916. Офанзива Брусилова - 4. јун
- 1917. Офанзива Керенског - 1. јул
- 1941. Операција Барбароса - 22. јун
- 1942. Друга битка за Харков - 12. мај (совјетски пораз)
- 1942. Операција Блау - 28. јун - немачки продор ка Стаљинграду
- 1943. Курска битка - 5. јул (операција је каснила због припрема)
- 1944. Операција Багратион - 22. јун (совјетска офанзива)
Видимо да је јун углавном био месец за главни напад у тој години.
Пролеће 1941. је било са доста киша, и требало је сачекати да се терен осуши како би био проходан.
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Формулација мита, да је Југославија својом жртвом спасила СССР?
Иако се у послератној литератури наводило да је КПЈ имала значајну улогу у 27. марту, данас се зна да је главни подстицај дошао из Велике Британије, која је у том периоду била у најтежим тренуцима борбе против Немачке.
СССР је немачки напад дочекао неспреман - Стаљин је покушавао да одржи неутралан став према Немачкој, иако је било евидентно да Немци спремају напад. Врло је упитно да ли би са једне стране изводио оваква непријатељска дејства ка Немачкој, а са друге стране потпуно неспремно дочекао њихов напад.
Такође, Југославија у том периоду није била комунистичка земља. КПЈ је била забрањена, а у Југославији је боравило доста бело-руских емиграната.
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Да ли би Немачки напад успео и да је кренуо раније?
Друго, далеко теже питање је да ли би немачки напад успео да је кренуо раније, чак и са мањим бројем снага које су ангажоване у нападу на Балкан.
Немци су имали огроман успех на самом почетку кампање. Али, и после неколико катастрофалних пораза совјети се нису предавали. Иако су побеђивали, немци су се истрошили током напада, а њихова линија снабдевања је постајала све дужа и све лошија. Немачка команда током планирања није узела у обзир захтеве снабдевања, тако да су пред Москвом, кад су јединице биле најистрошеније, уједно биле и најлошије снабдевене - што је створило прилику новоформираних совјетским јединицама да их поразе у бици код Москве.
Ова ситуација не би била другачија ни да је напад почео раније.
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Закључак:
Ако погледамо поново мит:
”Због пуча 27. марта и Априлског рата, немци су морали да одложе напад на СССР за 5 недеља. Због тога немци нису стигли до зиме до Москве, чиме је вероватно и спашен СССР.”
На основу приложеног материјала, можемо доћи до следећих закључака:
1. Пуч 27. марта је био подстрекиван од стране Енглеза, којима је одговарало да им се олакша положај. Пуч од 27. марта није олакшао позицију Великој Британији, те није ни чудо да је тај аспект занемарен.
2. Врло је дискутабилно да ли је уопште померен датум инвазије, а сигурно није за 5 недеља. Чак се може рећи да је ситуација у Грчкој заслужнија за евентуално одложење од Југославије. Две оклопне дивизије су се дуже задржале у Грчкој, а било је и озбиљних губитака у транспортној авијацији.
3. Кривац за пропаст операције Барбароса није касни почетак, већ грешке у логистичком планирању операције, чији је задатак немачка команда доста потценила.
Видимо да од оригиналног мита постоји само могућност да је померен почетак напада - мада и она није потпуно извесна, због временских услова.
Прилично далеко од тезе ”27. март је жртвовао Југославију, а спасио СССР.
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